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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ENFORCEABILITY OF RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS BY

COURT ACTION. [United States Supreme Court]

In the year that has passed since Shelley v. Kraemer' was decided,
a flood of comment has evidenced the sharp reaction of the legal and
business world to the decision that judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants violates the Constitution. With the better perspective gained through the passage of time, analysis of the decisions and
evaluation of the comments become less speculative, though, of course,
all the various ramifications of the controversy cannot yet be envisioned.
Though a lower federal court had held in 1892 that racial restrictive covenants were invalid as an attempt to achieve by contract a "result inhibited by the constitution," 2 this decision has been regularly
ignored or distinguished by later courts. By the time the Shelley case
was decided, nineteen states and the District of Columbia had held
such covenants valid and enforceable. 3
Nevertheless, the ruling that "in granting judicial enforcement of
1334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948). The Supreme Court of Missouri
upheld a covenant which imposed restrictions against ownership, or occupancy by
Negroes or Mongolians. Kraemer v. Shelley, 555 Mo. 814, 198 S. W. (2d) 679 (1946).
In the companion case of McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161
(1948), the Supreme Court of Michigan had enforced a covenant providing that
certain property should not be used or occupied by Non-Caucasians. Sipes v. McGhee, 3s6 Mich. 614, 25 N. W. (2d) 638 (1947).

2
Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181, 182 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1892). The deed provided that the property was never to be rented to a Chinaman. The court did not
rely upon discrimination expressed in the contract but on the judicial enforcement
of the restriction. The covenants were held to be invalid on additional grounds of
public policy and in violation of our treaty with China.
For an attack on the Supreme Court for not recognizing the United Nations
Law in the Shelley case, see Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law
(1948) 34 Iowa L. Rev. i, For the international aspects of the principal case, see
Kiang, Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in the United States (1949) 24
Wash. L. Rev. 1, 18.
3Lowe, Racial Restrictive Covenants (1948) 1 Ala. L. Rev. 15, 24, n. 40; Note
(1946) 40 II. L. Rev. 432, n. 3. For an excellent discussion of the problems involved
in racial restrictive covenants and for the state of law prior to Shelley v. Kraemer,
see McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional (1945)
33 Calif. L. Rev. 5. These restrictive devices may be attributed in large part to
the migration of colored people to urban centers. See, Nassau, Racial Restrictions
on the Alienation and Use of Land (1947) 21 Conn. B. J. 123.
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the restrictive agreements... the States have denied [the negro purchasers] the equal protection of the laws," 4 though it came with unexpected suddenness in Shelley v. Kraemer, was not a radical departure from earlier positions taken by the Supreme Court. In 1917,
Buchanan v. Warley held that racial segregation or racial zoning by
statute or city ordinance is unconstitutional because "The Fourteenth
Amendment and.., statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without
state legislation discriminating against him solely because of color." 5
It has been observed that the Shelley case "adds nothing to Buchanan
v. Warley as authority for a claim that all forms of segregation under
state authority are unconstitutional." 6
However this may be, the issue of whether enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants by state courts is a violation of the Equal Protective Clause had never been squarely presented to the Supreme Court
prior to 1948. Corriganv. Buckley,7 decided in 1926, though often cited
by state courts as settling this constitutional issue,8 "could not and did
not settle anything about the application of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the states, for the case came to the Supreme Court on appeal from a
court in the District of Columbia and involved a question of the law
of the District, to which the Fourteenth Amendment has no application." 9 The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and
indicated that it was not passing upon the merits of the case.10
'Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. , 20, 68 S. Ct. 836, 845, 92 L. ed. 1161, 1184 (1948).
1245 U. S. 6o, 79, 38 S.Ct. 16, 19, 62 L. ed. 149, 162 (1917). The rapid growth of
racial restrictive covenants is usually attributed to this decision. See McGovney,
Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional (1945) 33 Calif. L.
Rev. 5, and Kahan, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Reconsideration
of the Problem (1945) 12 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 198.
0
Note (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 978, 979"271 U. S. 323,

46 S. Ct.

o

521, 7

L. ed. 969 (1926).

gUnited Cooperative Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, io8 S. W. (2d) 507,
508 (1937); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Ad. 330, 333 (1938); Ridgway v.
Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 514,8296 N. Y. Supp. 936, 942 (1937); Lyons v. Wallen, 191
Olka. 567, 133 P. (2d) 555, 55 (1942); Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis. 389, 3 N. W. (2d)
734, 737 (1942).
OMcGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of
Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional
(1945) 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5,6. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. i, at 8-9, 68 S.Ct. 836,
at 839-840, 92 L. ed. 1161, at 1178 (1948).
0271 U. S.323, 332, 46 S.Ct. 521, 524, 70 L. ed. 969, 973 (1926). The United
States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held, that by the land law of
the District a restriction against sale to any member of a specified race is a lawful
restraint on alienation. 299 Fed. 899 (1924).
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But while the Court had never before given a direct answer to the
exact question of Shelley v. Kraemer, it has long been recognized that
"The judicial act of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively
construing and enforcing its laws, is the act of the State"" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Vinson, writing
for the Court in the Shelley case calls attention to the fact that "the
examples of state judicial action which have been held by this Court
to violate the Amendment's commands are not restricted to situations
in which the judicial proceedings were found in some manner to be
procedurally unfair. It has been recognized that the action of state
courts in enforcing a substantive common-law rule formulated by
those courts, may result in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the judicial proceedings in such
cases may have been in complete accord with the most rigorous con12
ceptions of procedural due process."'
It was only a short further step for the Court to determine that
though "the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed... by the Fourteenth
Amendment,"'u yet when the states made available "the full coercive
power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race
or color, the enjoyment of property rights ....'1"4 then "the States
have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws...."1 But
the query has been raised: "... in holding that state action is violative

of the equal protective clause, must it not also be shown that state action is what wrought the discrimination? ...In the cases relied upon
by the Supreme Court as constituting state action by courts ....the
action of the court itself was discriminatory. In the Shelley case, however, the only discrimination was that of the parties-and that was lawful."' The ultimate result is said to be "a legitimate, constitutional
contract which is unenforceable on constitutional grounds-literally
7
a contradiction in terms-an anomalous situationl"'
uTTwining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.78, 90-91, 29 S. Ct. 14, 16, 53 L. ed. 97, 102
(1908).
12334 U. S.1, 17, 68 S. Ct. 836, 844, 92 L. ed. 1161, 1182 (1948).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842,92 L. ed. 1161, sSo (1948).
14334 U. S.1,19, 68 S. Ct. 836, 845, 92 L. ed. 1161, 1183 (1948).
5334 U. S. 1, 20, 68 S. Ct. 836, 845, 92 L. ed. 1161, 1184 (1948).
"Walker, Judicial Enforcement of Racial Restrictive Covenants-The Spurious
Expansion of "State Action" (1948) 49 Va. B. A. Rep. 231, 242; Cf. Note (1947) 45
Mich. L. Rev. 733, 747.
1"W¢alker, Judicial Enforcement of Racial Restrictive Covenants-The Spurious
Expansion of "State Action" (1948) 49 Va. B. A. Rep. 231.
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The importance of the Restrictive Covenant cases in their effect
upon housing,'s segregation as a governmental policy, 19 and the aforementioned concept of what constitutes state action 20 will be indisputably great, even though one authority has, argued that the "... . practi-

cal consequences in the immediately foreseeable future will be small." 21
That the decisions may lead to repudiation of cases that have heretofore sustained legislation providing for segregation in transportation
facilities, hotels, restaurants, parks, churches and theatres, is also
22
possible.
'1"The immediate effect of the decisions will be to prevent federal and state
housing agencies from requiring or respecting judicial covenants in subsidized
housing and will do much to open a potentially huge housing market." Note (1948)
22 Temple L. Q. 138, 139.
""The significance of Racial covenants is said to be such that if these private
restrictive agreements were not enforceable, segregation in the North would be
nearly doomed and segregation in the South would be set back slightly." Clark
and Perlman, Prejudice and Property (1948) 27. "It does mean, however, a possible
end to last vestiges of legalized segregation in Northern states." Note (1948) 22
Temple L. Q. 138, 140.
-"The "tenuous distinction between direct and indirect state action" may be
destroyed. Note (1948) 48 Col. L. Rev. 1241, 1245. "Until the recent pressure, partly
exerted by the executive department, perhaps for political reasons for the sociological
changes reflected in the Shelley case, but few persons, if any, had seriously entertained the idea that a state court enforcement of a valid private contract was 'state
action' of the kind contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment." Walker, Judicial
Enforcement of Racial Restrictive Covenants-The Spurious Expansion of "State
Action" (1948) 49 Va. B. A. Rep. 231, 243. But see McGovney, Racial Residential
Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or
Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional (1945) 3 Calif. L. Rev. 5. Cf. Note (1947)
45 Mich L. Rev. 733, 747"Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48 (1948) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
1, 22. However, many states have already refused to enforce racial restrictive covenants on the authority of Shelley v. Kraemer; Claremont Improvement Club v. Buckingham, 200 P. (2d) 47 (Cal. App. 1948); Clayton v. Wilkins, 197 P. (2d) 162 (Cal.
1948); Cummings v. Hokr, 193 P. (2d) 742 (Cal. 1948); Tovey v. Levey, 4o Ill. 393,
82 N. E. (2d) 441 (1948); Goetz v. Smith, 62 A. (2d) 602 (Md. 1948); Malicke v. Milan,
32o Mich. 65, 32 N. W. (2d) 353 (1948); Woytus v. Winkler, 212 S. W. (2d) 411 (Mo.
1948); Rich v. Jones, 142 N. J. Eq. 215, 59 A. (2d) 839 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 298
N. Y. 59 o , 8t N. E. (2d) 325 (1948); Culver v. City of Warren, 83 N. E. (2d) 82 (Ohio
1948); Earley v. Baughman, 199 P. (2d) 21o (Okla. 1948).
In Perez v. Lippold, 198 P. (2d) 17 (Cal. 1948), the court cited Shelley v. Kramer
in declaring unconstitutional a statute providing that all marriage, of white persons
to Negroes or Mongolians are illegal and void.
In Seawell v. MacWithey, 63 A. (2d) 542 (N. J. 1949), the City of East Orange
was restrained from taking any action in furtherance of its policy of segregation in
emergency housing projects.
taMing, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203, 230-238; Barnett, Race-Restrictive
Covenants Restricted (1948) 28 Ore. L. Rev. 1, ii. The latter article includes a most
thorough citing of articles dealing with racial restrictive covenants.
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In view of such far-reaching considerations, it is not surprising that
numerous proposals have been suggested as means of avoiding the
effect of the decision. These plans range from mere voluntary adherence to covenants to creation of estates on special limitation, and
those more prominently mentioned include posting of a penalty
bond, trust devices, occupancy standards agreements, and conditions
subsequent. 2 Fortunately, these proposals are either impractical or
would require state court enforcement, now illegal. "When the various
proposals are considered, the conclusion seems warranted that the Restrictive Covenant decisions render ineffective any device for maintaining residential segregation whose usefulness depends on utilization ot governmental authority to achieve its end." 24 However, effective ways of maintaining segregation in housing still exist. Economic
factors operative in the allocation of housing, such as the power of
lending institutions to refuse loans on property not now occupied by
whites, and the present practice of real estate boards not to sell to
negroes property which is located in white neighborhoods, will, in
conjunction with the pressure of social attitudes, substantially con25
tinue racial segregation.
WILLIAM H.

VADiE

23Lowe, Racial Restrictive Covenants (1948) I Ala. L. Rev. 15, 32-34; Walker,
Judicial Enforcement of Racial Restrictive Covenants-The Spurious Expansion of
"State Action" (1948) 49 Va. B. A. Rep. 231, 244-246; Notes (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev.
978; (1948) 2 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 119. See Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities
of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248.
Voluntary adherence amounts to a mere "Gentlemen's Agreement." An estate
on special limitation is an estate that is to last only so long as no transfer or lease
is made to persons of a specified race. In the event of such transfer or lease, title
would revert to the original grantor. In a condition subsequent, the grantor or his
heir could defeat the estate, in the event of a breach, before the ordinary termination of the estate, but an actual entry would be necessary. By the trust device,
all property owners would be required to deed the property to a trustee at the
time they acquired title. The trustee, representing all the owners in the community,
would not pass title until assured of the race of the grantee. Adjoining land owners,
or real estate concern, would have the power of a veto over prospective purchasers.
Because of their obvious impracticability, additional methods, such as options to
repurchase and the use of personal deposits, need not be discussed.
2
Ming, Racial Restrictions and The Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203, 224.
2Ming, Racial Restrictions and The Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203, 225-228.
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CONTRACTS-PARTIAL ENFORCEABILITY OF UNREASONABLY BROAD COVENANT OF VENDOR NOT To COMPETE WITH PURCHASER OF BUSINESS.

[Connecticut]
Though it is well settled that contracts not to compete are enforceable if they are ancillary to the sale of a business and reasonably
limited as to space and time,1 the courts are in disagreement on the
question of whether, when such a restraint is found to be unreasonable,
it must be deemed completely void or may still be enforceable in part.2
The position taken by the majority of the American courts is exemplified by the recent Connecticut case of Beit et al. v. Beit.3 Plaintiffs
owned and operated three grocery stores in New London County, Connecticut, two in Norwich and one in New London, with customers
from Norwich, New London, and the towns contiguous thereto. Plaintiffs sold their entire business to defendant, the bills of sale containing
the following clause: "I further expressly covenant and agree with this
vendee .... not to engage in the meat market or grocery business within the limits of New London County, Connecticut, for a period of
thirty years, from this day." 4 A few months later one of the plaintiffs
started to purchase a grocery business in a town located in New London
County but not contiguous to either New London or Norwich. Upon
being advised the operation of this business would violate his contract
with defendants, he sought a declaratory judgment to determine the
legality of the covenant not to compete. The defendant contended that
if the court found the restraint to be unreasonable, it should still be
enforced to the extent that it was reasonably needed as a protection for
the business he had purchased-that is, in the towns of New London,
Norwich, and the adjoining towns.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that the restraint was unreasonable as to space, and refused to declare the covenant enforceable in any part. In spite of the fact that this decision
would allow the plaintiff deliberately to repudiate a covenant for
which he had received due consideration, 5 the court reasoned that
'Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588, (C. C. A. 7th, 1915);
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, io6 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887); Mitchel v. Reynolds,
i P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711); Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 515.
25 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1659; Note (1935) 15 B. U. L. Rev. 834.

263 A. (2d) x6i (Conn. 1948).
'63 A. (2d) 161, 162 (Conn. 1948).
rTwo justices dissented from the decision on the ground that plaintiff was not
entitled to bring a declaratory judgment action, because the record showed that

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

since the covenant was not divisible by its terms, to enforce it partially would be making a new contract for the parties by substituting
the intent of the court for the intent of the parties.6
Where the limits of the restraint are stated disjunctively in the
contract and the unreasonable parts may be crossed out, the courts
1
are unanimous in decreeing enforcement of those parts that are left.
But where the limitations are not disjunctively stated, relief is refused in the English courts, and in most American jurisdictions. 8
"Severance is permissible only in the case of a covenant which is in
effect a combination of several distinct covenants." 9 The basis of this
plaintiffs' case was based solely on the hardship which the covenant would impose
on themselves, without any indication of any adverse effect on the public. The
significant moral and policy considerations involved in the court's action in this
case, though ignored by the majority, were succinctly expressed by the dissent. "A
decision which establishes the right of a person, who today has executed such a
restrictive contract as here for a substantial consideration paid, to procure tomorrow
a decree of court which effectively determines that no liability rests upon him
under this contract and that he can keep the consideration he has received may
well constitute a potent temptation to fraud and place a premium upon dishonesty. Accordingly, the decision of this case involves not only the question
whether the terms of the contract itself were contrary to public policy but the
further question whether to aid the plaintiffs by granting the relief sought violates
the sound public policy of fostering rectitude and integrity and discouraging fraud
and dishonesty in business dealings. It can hardly be maintained that honesty in
business is any less the concern of public policy than is restraint against competition." Beit et al v. Beit, 63 A. (2d) 161, 166, 167 (Conn. 1948).
6
"The difficulty with [defendant's] position is that it gives effect to the conclusion of a court as to the extent to which a convenant unreasonably broad in its
terms can in fairness and equity be enforced rather than to the intent of the parties, who, had they desired a narrower provision, should have agreed upon it." Beit
et al v. Beit, 63 (2d) 161, 166 (Conn. 1948).
'This was formerly done by the "blue pencilling" method, which consisted of
running a mark through the part of the contract which was unreasonable. Price v.
Green, 16 M. & W. 346 (Ex. 1847). The modern practice is to simply look at the
contract, and if the court finds the covenants disjunctively stated, it enforces those
that are reasonable. General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N. W. 469
(1932); 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1659; Note (1935) 22 Va. L. Rev..94.
sAs for example, in Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E.
1048 (1895) where the unreasonable area was the entire state of Indiana, and the
court refused to enforce any part, even though enforcement was requested only in
the city of Hammond. Accord: Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278
(E. D. Ill. 1946); Trenton Potteries Co. v. Olyphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723
(18gg); Suesskind v. Wilson, 124 Ohio St. 54, 176 N. E. 889 (1931); Kex Mfg. Co.
v. Plu-Gum Co., 28 Ohio App. 514, 162 N. E. 816 (1928); Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa.
579, 6 At. 251 (1886); General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N. W.
469 (1932); Attwood v. Lamont, [192o]3 Ch. 571, 90 L. J. Ch. 121; 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § 166o; Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 518. For a general
discussion of the problem, see John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. (2d) 112
(S. D. N. Y. 1931).
DPollock, Contracts (12th ed. 1946) 327.
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view is that of the principal case, great emphasis being placed on the
doubtful reasoning that a new contract would be made by the court,' 0
and on the question-begging logic that "had [the parties] desired a
narrower provision, [they] should have agreed upon it.""
On the other hand, there is respectable authority to the effect that
such a contract may be enforced to the extent it is reasonable, even in
the absence of disjunctive terms.' 2 This view emphasizes the interests
of the purchaser, recognizing that the intention of the parties to the
covenant was to protect the purchaser, who, without that protection
would have on his hands an empty bargain.' 3 In a few jurisdictions,
courts following this view have been aided by statutes which have been
construed to authorize the court to enforce such covenants by making
the necessary division of the valid and invalid parts, even though no
divisibility inheres within the form of the contract.' 4
Perhaps the boldest of the courts which admittedly engage in "paring down" the contract is the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
which has had little trouble in providing relief for the purchaser. 15 Enforcement of a vendor's covenant not to compete is granted where
"Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278 (E. D. Ill. 1946); Consumers'
Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E. 1048 (1895).
'nBeit et al v. Beit, 63 A. (2d) 161, 166 (Conn. 1948).
"Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1930);
Ackelbein v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 233 Ky. 115 25 S. W. (2d) 62 (193o); Metropoliton Ice. Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N. E. 856 (1935); Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v.
Fleckenstein, 76 N. J. L. 613, 71 Atl. 265 (1908).
"-"Ackelbein v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 233 Ky. 115, 25 S. W. (2d) 62 (1930);
Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N. J. L. 613, 71 Atl. 265 (1908).
"One who sells the good will of a business may agree with the buyer, and one
who is employed as an agent, servant or employee may agree with his employer, to
refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old
customers of such employer within a specified county, city, or part thereof, so long
as the buyer or any person deriving title to the good will from him, and so long as
such employer carries on a like business therein." Ala. Code (194o) Tit. 9, § 23. The
courts have construed such statutes as giving them the power to cut down the restrictions to "a specified county, city, or part thereof" without regard to the fopof the covenant. Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 S. (2d) 240 (1944); Edwards v. Mullin, 220 Cal. 379, 30 P. (2d) 997 (1934); Herrington v. Hackler, 181 Okla. 396, 74 P.
(2d) 388 (1937).
'1Thus, where the unreasonable restraint was where the seller was then doing
business, the court enforced the contract to a lesser area which was necessary to
protect purchaser's business. Metropolitan Ice. Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N.
E. 856 (1935). Where restraint was "Commonwealth of Massachusetts," it was enforced in Boston only. Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926).
"Any of New England States" was enforced to "territory intensely covered by plaintiff," which was considerably less than New England. New England Tree Expert Co.
v. Russell, 3o6 Mass. 504, 28 N. E. (2d) 997 (1940). "Within four miles radius" was
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"reasonably necessary to enable the buyer to secure fully the good will
of his purchase;" and to the extent such protection for the buyer is
shown to be needed, it will be granted, "whether or not the agreement
is by its own terms divisible."'16 This position is further bolstered by
Professor Williston, who asserts that "Questions involving legality of
contracts should not depend on form."'17 Further, he points out the
weakness of the argument, sometimes advanced to support the majority
view, that the courts should not be called upon to create a remedy for
a vendee who has -attempted to saddle his vendor with an oppressive
restraint. Logically, if this policy argument were to be considered
valid, it should also defeat the enforcement of the reasonable parts
of a "divisible" covenant,' 8 but it is not, in fact, so applied. 19
In most of the cases in which relief is refused, the courts appear to
follow the inflexible procedure of looking over the contract to see
whether disjunctive words are used specifically, refusing partial enforcement on the ground that the contract is indivisible if no such
express terms are included.2 0 While this practice offers an easy, automatic means of deciding the case, it ignores the fact that a contract
may be divisible even though no disjunctive words are used in defining
the limitations of the agreement. The reports abound with cases holding that the divisibility of contracts depends upon the intention of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances. 21 It seems obvious that the
basic intent of the parties is to protect the purchaser's investment, and
that the terms of the contract implementing this intent should be
cut down to "territory necessary to protect the plaintiff." Brannen v. Bouley, 272
Mass. 67, 172 N. E. 104 (1930). "All former customers" cut down to customers of
city where business located. Whiting Milk Co. v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, i6g N.
E. 19 (1931). See Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N. E. 568, 570 (1922).
"Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N. E. 856, 857, 858 (1935).
.5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § i66o. "Public policy surely is not concerned to distinguish differences of wording in agreements of identical meaning."
The superficiality of the majority view can be demonstrated by a simple hypothetical case: X county contains only two towns, A. and B. The business sold is in
town A and protection from competition is needed only there. If the covenant
against engaging in business is phrased so as to cover "X county," or "all the towns
in X county," it would be completely invalid; but if it read "towns A and B. in
X county," or "town A and the rest of the towns in X county," it would be enforceable as to town A.
15 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) § i66o. See Wesley v. Chandler, 152
Okla. 22, 3 P. (2d) 72o, at 727 (1931).
"See text at note 7, supra.
"Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E. 1o48 (1895).
"Byers v. Fuller 58 F. Supp. 570 (E. D. Ky. 1945); Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz.
526, 78 P. (2d) 490 (1938); Will B. Miller Co. v. Laval, 283 Ky. 55, 140 S. W. (2d)
376 (1940); 13 C. J. 562.
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construed so as to effectuate it, if fairly possible. It would further seem
impossible for the parties to have an intent not to compete within a
certain area without having intent not to compete within each subdivision of that area.
The significance of the use of disjunctive words seems to pale in
the face of the argument that contracts should not be said to lack
validity merely because of the form in which they are written. The
failure of most courts to recognize this principle is especially regrettable
in view of the fact that an examination of the circumstances surrounding the making of such contracts usually indicates that the purchaser
would not have bought but for the protective covenant, or would have
paid considerably less for the business.
The contention that, by "paring down" the covenant the court
would be making a new contract for the parties, is not convincing
when tested against the powers equity courts have assumed in other
situations. Equity, when specific performance is impossible, will often
decree the performance which is as near to the contract terms as can
be accomplished under the circumstances.2 2 This is evidently not considered making a new contract for the parties, but rather is a justifiable
effort to reach an equitable result by placing the parties as near as possible to the object for which they contracted.23 When a wife refuses
to join in a conveyance of property which the husband has contracted
to sell,24 or where a tract of land is represented as containing a cer-

tain acreage but is found to be smaller than as specified in the contract, 25 equity readily decrees a conveyance of the land to the extent
the grantor is able to give good title, with an abatement of the original
purchase price to compensate for the discrepancy. The courts seem
to have no fear of being guilty of making a new contract for the parties
in such cases.20 It would appear that so far as the divisibility factor
22Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 359; McClintock, Equity (2d ed. 1948) § 54;
Walsh, Equity (1930) § 76.
"Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. City of Dayton, 177 Ky. 5o2, 197 S. W. 969 (1917);
Rector of St. David's Church v. Wood, 24 Ore. 396, 34 Pac. 18 (1893).
21Melamed v. Donabedian, 238 Mass. 133, 13o N. E. 110 (1921); Feldman v.
Lisansky, 239 N. Y. 81, 145 N. E. 746 (1924); Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 365.
2Binder v. Hejhal, 347 Ill. 11, 178 N. E. 9oi (1931); Pickens v. Pickens, 72 W.
Va. 5o, 77 S. E. 365 (ig'3); Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 365.
GIt is to be noted that in the mistake of area cases, it is said that the discrepancy
must not be so great as to go to the essence of the contract. 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence ( 5 th ed. 1941) § 1407. But the analagous limitation in the cases of
covenants not to compete would merely be that the partial enforcement of the restraint must achieve the essential purpose of giving the buyer reasonable freedom
from competition.
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is concerned, these two situations confront the courts with problems
which are analogous to those arising in cases for the partial' enforcement of contracts not to compete which contain covenants unreasonable as to space or time.
A contract partially enforced in such a manner would still have
the essential elements of the original contract as executed by the parties.
The vendee would receive the essence of the consideration for which
he entered the contract-i.e., the ownership of the business plus freedom from competition by the vendor within the area and time in
which such competition would likely be injurious to the business. The
fundamental intent would survive, as the smaller (reasonable) area
or time would naturally be included in the larger (unreasonable) area
or time originally agreed upon.
In refusing to grant partial enforcement, the principal decision not
only endorses a questionable line of reasoning, but also produces an
inequitable result in that it places a distinct hardship on the purchaser
and allows unjust enrichment to the seller. Courts would better observe the traditional role of equity by looking beyond the mere form of
the contract to determine to what extent enforcement can be granted
as a means of carrying out the substance of the agreement.
JOHN

G. Fox

DEBTORS' ESTATES-RIGHT OF DEBTOR TO CLAIM HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
IN INSURANCE PROCEEDS FROM NON-EXEMPT PROPERTY DESTROYED BY

FIRE. [Virginia]
The recent Virginia decision of Goldburg Co., Inc. v. Salyer' presents a problem unique in the law of debtors' homestead exemptions:
whether the insurance proceeds on non-exempt property that has been
destroyed by fire become exempt under a statutory provision allowing
an exemption to be declared in "money aild debts due."' 2 The defendant
debtor had insurance on a shifting stock of merchandise, which by
statute is specifically excluded from the property that a debtor may
claim as a homestead exemption. 3 After fire had destroyed the stock of
1i88 Va. 573, 5o S. E. (2d) 272 (1948).
Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 6531: "Every householder or head of a family...
shall be entitled .... to hold exempt from levy .... his real and personal property, or
either, to be selected by him, including money and debts due him, to the value of
not exceeding two thousand dollars;..."
Wa. Code Ann (Michie, 1942) § 6531:

...

provided, that such exemption shall

not extend to any execution order or other process issued on any demand in the
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goods, plaintiff sought to garnish the debts that two insurance companies owed defendant, but defendant claimed $2,000 of the proceeds
as an exemption, which he had duly asserted and recorded. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the trial court in permitting
defendant to claim his exemption, basing its decision primarily on the
view that "The claim was not to a shifting stock of merchandise; it
was specifically for 'money and debts due,' a classification of property
4
entitled to be claimed as exempt."
Since the statute allows an exemption in "money and debts due"
to the debtor, and since the proceeds of insurance which are validly
owing constitute a debt from company to the insured-debtor, the decision seems clearly justifiable as a literal application of the words of
the statute. 5 However, further analysis of the purpose and policy of
the exemption statutes suggests several questions which the court's
opinion leaves unanswered.
The purpose of homestead exemptions is well stated in the principal case as being "to insure the unfortunate debtor and his equally
unfortunate, but more helpless family, a means of shelter and a measure of existence." 6 Nonetheless, the protection afforded by such laws
has its limits. They are not intended to be used to avoid payment of
honest debts unless the peculiar need for family preservation is present.7 The fundamental policy behind exemptions, then, is to provide
following cases: .... Seventh. Said exemption shall not be claimed or held in a
shifting stock of merchandise...."
'i88 Va. 573, 580, 50 S. E. (2d) 272, 276 (1948).
"For a similar conclusion, see Note (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 125.
6188 Va. 573, 577, 50 S. E. (2d) 272, 274 (1948).
7For instance, the general nle is that the marriage of a debtor subsequent to
a levy on his property for a debt owing does not entitle him to the property exemption ordinarily enjoyed by the head of a family. Stevens v. Carey, 112 W. Va. i,
2, 163 S. E. 772 (1932): "The statute [on personal property exemptions] should receive a liberal construction in favor of the debtor in order to effectuate the humanitarian purpose; but it should not be construed so as to disturb vested rights, and
arm the debtor with a weapon to impose hardships on his neighbor." For similar
holdings, see Richardson v. Adler, 46 Ark. 43 (1885); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 81 9 ,
75 So. 3o (1917); Rock v. Haas, 110 Ill. 528 (1884); Selders v. Lane, 40 Ohio 345
(1883); Pender v. Lancaster, 14 S. C. 25, 37 Am. Rep. 720 (1880); 22 Am. Jur.,
Exemptions § 2. There are decisions to the contrary, however. See Robinson v.
Hughes, 117 Ind. 293, 2o N. E. 220 (1889); Trotter v. Dobbs, 38 Miss. 198 (1859).
The present rule in Virginia, established by Oppenheim v. Ayers, 99 Va. 582,
39 S. E. 218 (igoi) after the court had adopted the contrary view in Kennerly v.
Swartz, 83 Va. 704, 3 S. E. 348 (1887), is that the homestead may be claimed by a
householder against a judgment obtained against him before he became a householder. This rule is now codified in Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1948) § 6543:
"The real or personal estate, which a householder, his widow, or minor children
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some unassailable assets which particular creditors cannot reach, so
that society in general will not be charged with the burden of providing for the improvident debtor and his hapless family.
The generally accepted rule that the insurance proceeds on exempt
property are themselves exempt is founded on the proposition that,
for purposes of debtors' exemptions, the insurance takes the place of
the property destroyed, so that the debtor can restore his originally
exempt property and thereby effectuate the intent of the legislature
that that property be free from the claims of creditors.8 A corollary
which may seem naturally to follow is that insurance proceeds on nonexempt property are themselves non-exempt. 9 And it has, in fact, been
are entitled to hold as exempt, may be set apart at any time before the same is subjected by sale or otherwise under judgment, decree, order, execution, or other
legal process .....
See also Smith v. Holland, 124 Va. 663, 98 S. E. 676 (1919).
'In the statutes of some of the states, notably Arizona, Minnesota and Washington, it is expressly provided that the proceeds of insurance on property which
is itself exempt from the claims of creditors shall also be exempt. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Par. 3302, Subsec. x6; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9447, Subsec. 13; Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (1932) § 563.
Even aside from statute, the great weight of authority is that an exemption of
certain property from execution extends to the insurance due for the destruction
thereof. Probst & Hilb v. Scott, 31 Ark. 652, 657 (1877). "The property being exempt.
it is but reasonable that the compensation for the loss, which represents the property,
should also be exempt."
"The reason for the rule is found in the fact, that the property has been
exempted by law for the use of the exemptor and his family, and he may insure it
to protect himself and them from loss. It is intended by the insurance, to secure
the means, in case of loss, for the restoration of the property after its destruction
by fire. Not to allow the insurance money after loss, to take the place of the property destroyed, and be exempt from liability to the debts of the exemptor, would,
by a mere technical evasion, pervert the object and spirit of the statutes of exemptions, always to be liberally construced in favor of the exemptor." Ellis v. Pratt
City, iii Ala. 629, 2o So. 649, 650 (1896). See also Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 194
Ala 477, 69 So. 916 (1915); Reynolds v. Haines, 83 Iowa 342, 49 N. W. 851 (1891);
Thompson-Ritchie & Co. v. Graves, 167 La. 1024, 120 S. E. 634 (1929). In Puget
Sound Dressed-Beef & Packing Co. v. Jeffs, i1 Wash. 466, 39 Pac. 962 (1895), the
court said: "If the householder is to be protected in the use and enjoyment of his
household furniture, he should be protected in taking such steps as will enable
him to replace it if lost or destroyed; and common prudence would require that
he should make some provision which would enable him to replace it in case it
was destroyed by fire .... And when such policy [of insurance] is procured, and
money paid on account of the destruction of the property, the object of the legislature can only be subserved by holding that such money takes the place of the property insured, and, until a reasonable time has elapsed for its being used in replacing the destroyed property, is exempt from execution, the same as the property
would have been."
OSimmang v. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co., 102 Tex. 39, 112 S. W. 1044, 132
Am. St. Rep. 846 (19o8); Cities Service Oil Co. v. North River Insurance Co., 130
Tex. 186, 107 S. W. (2d) 994 (1937). The present case recognized these decisions but
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stated that, as a general rule, for the insurance proceeds to be held
exempt the "property must be exempt, and it must have been exempt
at the time it was burned."' 0 This rule obviously results from the
reasoning that the money stands in place of the destroyed non-exempt
property as assets from which creditors may satisfy their claims.
The court in the principal decision, confronted with the words
"money or debts due" in the Virginia statute, has felt itself impelled to
break away from this corollary and regard the insurance proceeds as a
chose in action rather than as a form of replacement of the goods."
The destroyed goods were in an expressly non-exempt form but the
insurance proceeds were held to be free from the claims of creditors.
If the purpose of the statute to protect the debtor's exemptions is
served by having insurance proceeds stand in the place of the exempt
property destroyed, it is arguable that protection of creditors' rights
requires that insurance proceeds on non-exempt property should be
non-exempt.
In consideration of the precise issue of the principal case, however,
this contention must be tested by an inquiry as to why the legislature
made a shifting stock of goods expressly non-exempt in the first place.
There are two possible reasons. The provision may have been adopted
in order to give creditors a manifest assurance of tangible assets upon
which to levy in case of default. If this was the intent, then allowing an
exemption in the insurance proceeds defeats that interest which the
legislature desired to create for the benefit of creditors. But if, on the
other hand, the non-exemption was established merely to avoid the
administrative difficulty of ascertaining which goods the debtor's declaheld them inapplicable, because Texas had no statute allowing an exemption in
money and debts due. In Peerless Pacific Co. v. Burckhard, go Wash. 221, 155 Pac.
1037 (i6),

the court held that notwithstanding a statute allowing an exemption in

insurance proceeds on exempt property destroyed by fire, the insurance money on
property not exempt as a homestead which had been burned to the ground does
not become exempt by the subsequent marriage of the owner making him an elio
gible head of a family. See also Fletcher v. Staples, 62 Minn. 471, 64 N. W. ii5
(1895) where under a statute exempting from execution "all moneys arising from
insurance of any property exempted from sale on execution, when such property has
been destroyed by fire," the court denied the exemption because the debtor had
failed to prove that the property itself was exempt.
"35 C. J. S., Exemptions § 61.
"It is to be noted that insurance proceeds are commonly treated as a chose in
action rather than a replacement of the goods in other branches of insurance law.
For instance, upon the death of the insured, the proceeds of insurance on destroyed
property generally pass to his personal representative as a chose in action rather than
to the heir or devisee who would have been entitled to the property itself. Vance,
Insurance (2d ed. 1g3o) 667.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. VI

ration would cover, then the legislative purpose is not to protect the
claims of creditors to those assets; and as soon as the uncertain identity
of shifting stock is transferred into a sum certain of money, the reason
for the non-exemption ceases to exist.
The statute itself is silent as to the specific purpose of this clause,
but if the legislature had meant to favor creditors, it seems doubtful
that the assets selected for non-exemption would be those consisting
of a changing supply of merchandise. Because such assets would be
expected to vary widely in value and appearance from week to week,
and often would be subject to liens in favor of wholesalers supplying
the goods to the debtor, they would not furnish a satisfactory fund
upon which execution creditors could rely. On the other hand, the
changing identity of the goods would inevitably raise difficulties in
determining exactly what property should be saved from levy after a
2
declaration of exemption had been made in the stock of merchandise.'
That the latter consideration affords the true explanation for the
shifting stock of goods clause is substantiated by some case authority.
In Edgewood Distilling Co., Inc. v. Rosser's Adm'r et al.'3 it was held
that the death of the owner terminated the shifting-stock inhibition of
the exemption statute. The court there observed that "the business absolutely terminated with the death of Rosser, and the stock ceased to
be shifting and became fixed and stable, and so remained intact until,
as remarked, it was converted into money by the administrator by a
sale at public auction and in bulk."' 4
It would appear, therefore, that the purpose of the statute in making shifting stocks of merchandise non-exempt is to avoid administrative
difficulty, and when that consideration is removed, as by destruction of
the stock by fire, then the exemption in the insurance proceeds which
take its place should be allowed.
A further inquiry is warranted as to the policy supporting such a
'1In Wray v. Davenport, 79 Va. 19, 25 (1884) the court observed: "...from the
very nature of the case, it was difficult to claim a homestead in a shifting stock in
active trade." See also In re Tobias, 1o Fed. 68 (W. D. Va. sgoo).
23n16 Va. 624, 82 S. E. 716 (1914).
"'116 Va. 624, 626, 627, 82 S.E. 716, 717 (i94). See in re Tobias, 1o3 Fed. 68 (IV.
D. Va. sgoo), decided before the Virginia statutory prohibition against claiming an
exemption in a shifting stock of merchandise was enacted. The question was considered whether a bankrupt householder should be entitled to have a homestead
exemption in a shifting stock of goods. The court held that where the debtor has
surrendered to the trustee in bankruptcy his stock of goods in bulk, the shifting
character of such property will not prevent the bankrupt from claiming his exemption therein, since by the surrender'to' the trustee, the property loses its shifting character and the exemption claimed may be identified with certainty.

1949]

CASE COMMENTS

statutory purpose. If the debtor, by virtue of the current interpretation
of the statutes, can convert non-exempt property into exempt insurance proceeds, the way is open for deliberately insuring non-exempt
goods, with the view of bringing about their "accidental" destruction
and then successfully claiming an exemption in the proceeds. 15 Quite
obviously, if the destruction of the non-exempt property were proved
to be intentional, the insurance company would not recognize the claim,
and no question of exemption would arise. Yet, fire accidents are
so easily staged that it may be unwise to permit a scheming debtor to
seize upon the benevolent spirit of the legislators and the overly-kind
disposition of their interpreters to milk not only the insurance companies but also the honest and innocent creditors. The spirit of exemption laws is "to give protection to the unfortunate ... , not to fortify
the crafty and designing ....
It is to be noted that Section 6531 of the Virginia Code stipulates, among other things, that there will be no exemption recognized
"in any property the conveyance of which by the homestead claimant
' 7
has been set aside on the ground of fraud or want of consideration."
In view of the principal decision, it is necessary to ask whether, if such
property is insured and then destroyed by fire, the non-exempt status
of the property will be terminated so as to allow an exemption in the
proceeds as "money and debts due." Such would naturally result if the
rule of the Goldburg case is to be literally applied. But the policy prohibiting exemptions in property set aside because fraudulently conveyed, which must be one of penalty rather than expediency, would
seem to carry beyond the mere destruction of the property.' s As the reason supporting the non-exemption is the fraudulent disposition of the
debtor, and as this disposition is not cured by the transfer of interest
from the property to the proceeds of insurance, the debtor should not
be rewarded fortuitously with an exemption by the ill stroke, or ex2It was held in Lederburg v. Miller, 21o Fed. 614 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913) that a
failing debtor in contemplation of bankruptcy could not transmute a shifting stock
of merchandise which was not exempt into exempt property by withdrawing it
from sale for the purpose of claiming it as an exemption.
"Burton & Co. v. Mill and als., 78 Va. 468, 481 (1884).
1
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 6531.
"In Dickinson and others v. Patton and others, 11o Va. 5, 65 S. E. 529 (1909),
the husband conveyed his property to his wife without consideration, in fraud of
his creditors. The court indicated that the wife after her husband's death could
not claim a homestead exemption in the property which had been set aside as .a
fraudulent conveyance. However, the wife was held to be entitled to be repaid the

purchase money lien she had paid off.
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pertly conceived stroke, of fortune. One's punishment, if such be the
purpose of this non-exemption, should not be switched to favoritism
because of ashes. Yet the statute, as applied by the instant decision,
might be regarded as permitting the exemption, since a right is recognized in the debtor to declare his exemption from the insurance money
due him, regardless of the exemption status of the insured property
which the fire has destroyed.
Upon a literal application of the statute and on the specific facts
involved, the principal case is correctly decided. The intent of the legislature should be controlling. Though not investigated by the decision,
that intent can be construed to support the present case, since it appears that shifting stocks of merchandise were made non-exempt because of the impracticability of administration of such an exemption,
and not because of any solicitude for creditors in maintaining such
stock as a leviable asset. And when the reason for the non-exemption
perished in the flames, the non-exemption status was consumed also.
The reasoning employed in the opinion is, however, open to some
criticism because it may be thought to enunciate a blanket proposition
that the character of property insured is lost when the property is destroyed, and that the proceeds of insurance thereon are exempt, if so
claimed, because they are "money and debts due."
JACK B. COULTER

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LIABILITY OF ESTATE OF DECEASED HUSBAND FOR
SUPPORT OF CHILDREN UNDER DIVORCE DECREE.

[West Virginia]

The especial interest of society in assuring that adequate support
is provided for children makes the duty of parents to care for their
offspring a matter of more than merely private parental concern. The
fact that the state itself has much at stake may well justify the subordination of other valid claims against the assets of the head of a family
when these claims conflict with the needs of the wife or children for
support. This principle has long been recognized in the field of creditors' rights,' but the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has, in
a divided decision, recently refused to apply it in a controversy re1
Homestead exemption statutes giving the debtor the right to remove certain
property from the reach of creditors' claims are based on the policy of protection
of the dependents of the debtor from destitution. See Goldburg Co., Inc., v. Salyer,
188 Va. 573, at 577, 50 S. E. (id) 272, at 274 (1948), noted (1949) 6 Wash. and Lee
L. Rev. 202. Similarly, the Federal Bankruptcy Act § 17 (a) (2) exempts from the
effect of a discharge in bankruptcy, debts for alimony arid support of wife or child.
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garding the divorced husband's duty to provide support for his children after his death. In Robinson v. Robinson et al.,2 it was held that
where, by a divorce decree awarded against a husband, custody of the
children is granted to the wife, and the husband is required to pay a
fixed sum monthly for the support of such children, the decree becomes
a lien upon the real estate of the husband, enforceable as the payments
accrue during his lifetime but not valid against his estate, real or personal, after his death.
The West Virginia court and other tribunals with whose holdings
it is in accord 3 seem to base their decisions principally upon the ground
that a father's common law duty to support his minor children ceases
at his death. It is said that "A decree against a father for maintenance
and support, adds nothing to his obligation to support his children
during their minority; it only provides for the enforcement of such
duty. ''4 This contention loses its persuasiveness when it is recognized
that, after the bonds of matrimony have been severed by a court, the
power of that tribunal to provide for the support of the children derives, not from the common law, but from the statute which confers
authority to enter the support provision in the decree. 5
The majority opinion in the Robinson case sets forth, as an additional consideration, the fact that to allow the support provision to be
enforced against the husband's estate would make possible changes in
the course of descent and distribution where the owner of property dies
intestate or where he dies testate and attempts to divide his property
among his children. It is said that minor children of the first marriage
would find themselves in a more favored position than other offspring
of that or a subsequent marriage. Further, the court points out, the
survival of the decree would "in many cases, place the entire estate of
a decedent beyond the reach of his creditors, and apply it to the support and maintenance of his children during their minority." 6
250 S. E. (2d) 455 (W. Va. 1948).
3The courts of Florida, Kentucky, Maryland and New York adopt the view
that a father's liability under the decree terminates with his death. Guinta v. Lo Re,
31 S. (2d) 704 (Fla. 1947); Sandlin's Admx. v. Allen, 262 Ky. 355, 90 S. W. (2d) 50
(1936); Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 At. 841, 50 A. L. R. 232 (1927); In re
Johnson's Estate, 185 Misc. 352, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 771 (1945). In the Massachusetts
case of Barry v. Sparks, 306 Mass. 80, 27 N. E. (2d) 728 (1940), there is dictum to
the effect that death terminates the father's liability, although the precise point
was not before the court in that case.
'Robinson v. Robinson et al., 50 S. E. (2d) 455, 460 (W. Va. 1948).
"Avila v. Leonardo, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 602, 128 P. (2d) 43 (1942); White v. Shalit,
136 Me. 65, 1.A. (2d) -765 (938). Also see. dissent in Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644,
135 At. 841, at 845, 50 A. L. R. 232, at 239 (1927).
8
Robinson v. Robinson et al., 5o S. E. (2d) 455, 460 (W. Va. 1948). That such

210

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

However, as indicated by Judge Haymond in his dissent, employment of these arguments suggests a fundamental misconception of the
nature and effect of the decree handed down by the divorce court. It is
settled law that "One effect of a judgment is to merge therein the
cause of action on which the action is brought, from the date of the
judgment." 7 This is true regardless of the nature of the original cause
of action. It seems therefore, that the proper determinant of whether
the decree is to be enforceable against the deceased husband's estate
would be the effect given to it by statute. The West Virginia Code
provides that "Every judgment for money rendered in this State...
shall be a lien on all the real estate of or to which the defendant in
such judgment is or becomes possessed or entitled...." A judgment
lien should continue to be enforceable until satisfied in a legal manner. 10 Thus, the infant beneficiary of the support provision in the decree of divorce stands in the relation of judgment creditor to his
father's estate, and the arguments set forth by the majority of the
court regarding the favored position of the minor child are no more
valid in respect to his claim than they would be to that of any other
judgment creditor."1
A preponderance of the decided cases' 2 seems to be in conflict with
an eventuality would not be inconsistent with social policy as reflected in established law is demonstrated by the exemption provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy
Act and by State homestead exemption statutes, which may operate to withdraw
all of the assets of the debtor's estate from reach of his creditors in order to provide
maintenance for his family. See Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 19o U. S. 294, 23 S.
Ct. 751, 47 L. ed. io6i (19o3).
73o Am. Jur., Judgments § 15o.
830 Am Jur., Judgments § 154; 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed., Tuttle, 1925) §
579.
9V. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 3766.
"Laidley et al. v. Reynolds et al., 58 W. Va. 418, 52 S. E. 405 (19o5); Renic v.
Ludington, 14 W. Va. 367 (1878); 2 Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th ed., Tuttle, 1925) § 997:
"Payment is the only act by which the defendant can discharge or avoid the lien
of a judgment, except where the statute creates a lien on chattels and contemplates
that the destruction, removal or sale may, under certain circumstances, extinguish
the lien."
"Generally... an existing lien is not destroyed by the debtor's subsequent
death, though this may affect the time and manner of its enforcement." 2 Freeman

§ 1009.
"The fact that the judgment requires installments to be paid in the future
does not prevent the creation of a lien, enforceable after the debtor's death. Isaacs
v. Isaacs' Guardian, 117 Va. 730, 86 S. E. 1o5 (1915); Goff v. Goff, 6o W. Va. 9, 53
S. E. 769 (19o6).
22Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 6o8, 15 P. (2d) 511 (1932); Myers v. Harrington,
70 Cal. App. 68o, 24 Pac. 412 (1925); Miller v. Miller, 64 Me. 484 (1874); West v.
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the Robinson case. In some of the decisions the support provision was,
by the decree, expressly made a lien on the husband's property, but in
a greater number of these cases applicable statutes were deemed sufficient to give the same effect to the provision for the children. In
neither situation did the courts find any difficulty in adjudging that
the liens should be enforceable against the husband's estate after his
death. The West Virginia court, however, purports to find in some of
these opposite holdings a factor which, it is said, renders them distinguishable from the Robinson case. This factor is exemplified in the
Oklahoma case of Smith v. Funk.13 There the divorce court, decreeing
that the defendant-husband pay a stipulated sum monthly for the support of the minor children, ratified and confirmed a separation agreement which contained conditions respecting the support of the children similar to those found in the decree. Although the appellate court
intimates that it would have made a like decision even in absence of the
separation agreement, it did decide on the basis of the agreement that
the support provision of the decree constituted a continuing claim
against the deceased father's estate. It is to be noted that the decree in
the Robinson case similarly recited that "... it appearing to the court

that the defendant has voluntarily agreed to pay the sum of $45.oo per
month for the support and maintenance of said children..., it is
adjudged, ordered and decreed..." that he be required to pay that
amount.' 4 Yet, even if it be conceded that the West Virginia court is
correct in its apparent assumption that the trial judge's decree did not
contemplate ratification of a separation agreement as was done in
Smith v. Funk, it does not follow that the effect of a judgment could
be impaired by the absence of a contract or agreement, or bolstered by
its presence. The decree, which by its terms was to continue "until
further order of the Court,"'15 should be given the effect for which its
words call.
The courts of New York reach a result similar to that attained by
West, 241 Mich. 679, 217 N. W. 924 (1928); Creyts v. Creyts, 143 Mich. 375, io6 N.
W. I1M, 114 Am. St. Rep. 656 (i9o); Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N. W.
(2d) 30 (1948)); Silberman v. Brown, 72 N. E. (2d) 267 (Ohio 1946); Smith v. Funk,
X41 Okla. 188, 284 Pac. 638 (1930); Mansfield v. Hill, 56 Ore. 400, 107 Pac. 471
(igio), modified on rehearing 56 Ore. 400, io8 Pac. 1007 (1910); Murphy v. Moyle, 17
Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1oo, 7o Am. St. Rep. 767 (1898); Gainsburg v. Garbarsky, 157
Wash. 537, 289 Pac. sooo (1930); Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 82o, 48 L.
R. A. (N.s.) 429 (1913).
"141 Okla. 188, 284 Pac. 638 (1930).
"SO S. E. (2d) 455, 462 (W. Va. 1948).
25Robinson v. Robinson et al., 50 S. E. (2d) 455, 462 (W. Va. -1948).
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the West Virginia case, but on different reasoning. 16 New York follows
the majority rule that an award of alimony does not survive the death
of either party, 17 and in that state the word "alimony" is held to include awards made for the support of children.' s Therefore, the support provisions in the decree do not continue to be enforceable after
the husband's death. Since awards of alimony are grounded on widely different considerations from those for support of children,' 9 it is
doubtful that the analogy between the two is justifiable. The controlling factor should be the statutory effect of the judgment. If by its
terms the support provision of the decree is made a lien on the husband's property, or if by statute it is given such an effect, the deceased
father's estate should be liable under it.
The necessity for support of minor children remains the same no
matter whether the father is living or dead. 20 If, for reasons appearing sufficient to the court which hands down the divorce decree, the
father is required to contribute to the support of the children, the
mere fact of his death does not render the children less deserving
of support. Though a father enjoys a common law right to disinherit
his children, such action should be countenanced only where family
relations remain intact and the danger of the unreasonable exercise
of that arbitrary right is negligible. 21 But when the father is responsible for the break-up of his family, and his children become in a sense
wards of the court, sound social policy dictates that this power be taken
from him. There is little doubt, therefore, that from the standpoint of
policy as well as from that of adherence to settled principles of law,
the dissent in the Robinson case presents the more desirable view.
JACK

A.

CROWDER

"-In re Johnson's Estate, 185 Misc. 352, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 771 (1945).
7
" Roberts v. Higgins, 122 Cal. App. 170, 9 P. (2d) 517 (1932); Allen v. Allen, iii
Fla. 733, 1.o So. 237 (1933); 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation § 6o8.
"Schafer v. Schafer, x18 Misc. 254, 193 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1922).
""Maintenance of a child is in no sense alimony, for alimony is a matter between husband and wife, while maintenance of a child rests upon the paternal relation." West v. West, 241 Mich. 679, 217 N. W. 924, 925 (1928).
2In re Estate of Smith, 200 Cal. 654, 254 Pac. 567, at 569 (1927).
"Miller v. Miller, 64 Me. 484 (1874): "If, from hostility to the mother, or other
cause, there is danger that the father will disinherit his children, and leave them
to be supported by their mother without any aid from his estate, a decree may
very properly be made for their support, that shall continue in force after his decease, or until they are of sufficient age to provide for themselves; or, at least, till
the further order of the court."
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LABILITY OF HUSBAND, AFTER ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE, FOR PERSONAL INJURIES INFLICTED ON WIFE DURING CovERTURE. [Massachusetts]

The common law prohibition against liability between husband
and wife for their torts,1 having arisen from the classical idea of the
unity of husband and wife, 2 has been severely criticised in modem
times as being outmoded and impractical of application. 3 Nevertheless, the courts have doggedly adhered to the rule, justifying it as a
means of preserving "domestic tranquility." 4 If preservation of the
peace and harmony of the home is the basis of the rule of non-liability
of the spouse, then logically, where the home is already broken by
legal dissolution of the marriage, that rule should no longer be a bar
to recovery for torts committed during coverture. This point appears
to be conceded in the cases of completely void marriages wherein no
husband and wife relationship ever existed. 5 However, in the cases of
voidable marriages, the courts usually reject the argument, relying on
the antiquated doctrine of unity of husband and wife. This theoretical
unity is supposed to have prevented a cause of action from ever having
arisen from the tort,6 and so divorce does not affect the situation.7 Even
"Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 6,1, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. ii8o (igo);
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877); Phillips v. Barnet, i Q. B. D.
436 (1876).
7Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. ii8o (igio);
Phillips v. Barnet, i Q. B. D. 436 (1876).
'See Judge Pound's dissent in Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927);
Note (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 383.
'Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 1oo So. 591 (1924); Lilliankamp v. Rippetoe,
133 Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628 ('915); McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic
Relations 0930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1o3o.

'See Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N. E. (2d) 637, 2 A. L. R. (2d) 632
(1948).
A completely void marriage is one that is prohibited by law, such as a bigamous
marriage, or one prohibited because of the consanguinity or affinity between the
parties. Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 145, 16 S. (2d) 401 ('944); Osoinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564, 18o So. 577 (1938); Ragan v. Cox, 2o8 Ark. 8o9, 187 S. W. (2d)
874 (1945); Whitney v. Whitney, 192 Okla. 174, 134 P. (2d) 357 (1942). See Steerman
v. Snow, 94 N. J. Eq. 9, 118 Atl. 696, 698 (1922); 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and
Separation (1891) § 258.
OLeonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 11o, 153 N. E. 93

(1925);

Courtney v.

Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 66o (1939).
7Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N. E. 462 (1896); Lindley v. Cusson, 22
N. Y. S. (2d) 516 (940).
1930).

See Spector v. Weisman, 4o F. (2d) 792, 793 (App. D. C.

A few jurisdictions hold that coverture merely bars the remedy and does not
wipe out the cause of action. Broddus v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 6oi, 136 S. W. (2d)
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that questionable logic is not available to defend the rule in case the
marriage is annulled, if it is true, as many courts have said, that annulment renders the marriage void ab initio, leaving the parties as if
8
no marriage had ever existed.
But the recent case of Callow v. Thomas9 indicates again that courts
may ignore legal logic as well as practical considerations in upholding
the non-liability of the former spouse after annulment. In this case,
the wife, during the existence of a voidable marriage, was a "gratuitous passenger" in the husband's car and was injured due to his grossly
negligent operation of the car. Later she had the marriage annulled
because of the husband's fraud, and shortly thereafter sued the husband for the injuries sustained in the automobile accident. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in denying the wife's recovery, held
that annulment does not make a voidable marriage void ab initio for
all purposes, pointing out that the doctrine of relation back is a legal
fiction not be pressed too far, and that it has limits prescribed by
public policy. In its conclusion the court adopted the rather flimsy
"rule" that transactions which have been concluded and things which
have been done during a voidable marriage ought not to be reopened
or undone after the decree of annulment. In arriving at this result the
Massachusetts court relied primarily upon five English casesl 0-none of
1052 (1940); McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 18o, 146 So. 877 (1933).
Thus, the court that decided the principal case (see note 9, infra) had previously held
that, divorce removing the bar, suit could then be brought on a contract action.
Giles v. Giles, 293 Mass. 495, 2oo N. E. 378 (1936). The Massachusetts court seems
to be drawing a rather fine distinction between actions ex contractu and ex delicto.
8
U. S. ex rel. Lubbers v. Reimer, 22 F. Supp. 573 (D. C. N. Y. 1938) (retroactive
and renders marriage utterly void ad initio); Steerman v. Snow, 94 N. J. Eq. 9, 118
At. 696 (1922) (null and void from the beginning); In re Moncrief's Will, 235 N. Y.
390, 139 N. E. 550 (1923) (void ad initio, even to making illegitimate a child born
during supposed marriage); Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N. Y. 209, 186 N. E. 675
(1933) (destroys from beginning as source of rights and duties); Southern Ry. Co.
v. Baskett, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S. W. (2d) 498 (1939) (renders it a nullity-judicially
declares it never a legal and lawful marriage); s Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and
Separation (1891) §§ 636, 640.
0322 Mass. 550, 78 N. E. (2d) 637, 2 A. L. R. (2d) 632 (1948).
'OAntsey v. Manners, Gow 1o. 171 Eng. Rep. 821 (1818) (H was held not liable
for debts contracted by W after decree of nullity, from which it is inferred he would
be liable for those contracted for before the decree); P v. P, [1916] 2 Ir. R. 400 (after
annulment of a voidable marriage, W sued H to recover her dowry and was allowed to recover all but a small part spent by H for their joint benefit); Dunbar
v. Dunbar, [1909] 2 Ch. 639 (an annulment of a voidable marriage was not allowed
to disturb a completed transaction, namely, the purchasing of a house by H and
having it conveyed to H and W as joint tenants); Dodworth v. Dale, [1936] 2 K. B.
503 (inspector of taxes was not allowed to assess H for additional taxes because of
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which were for torts for personal injury and some of which were not
even between husband and wife-and a quotation from Chief Judge
Cardozo's opinion in American Surety Company v. Conner."
The courts, in saying that all annulments do not render the marriage void ab initio for purposes of actions ex delicto between the
spouses, commonly refer to "public policy" as the reason. Actually,
the idea behind this public policy is apparently the general common
law concept of not allowing suits between husband and wife. Several
theories are advanced to substantiate this idea today, those most commonly used being: (a) unity of husband and wife; 12 (b) preservation
of the peace and harmony of the home; 13 (c) failure of a cause of action to arise, due to the nature of the relationship; 14 (d) transformation of the wife's causes of action into those of the husband upon marriage;15 and (e) adequacy of the wife's remedy in the criminal and
divorce courts.1
These theories will hardly stand up under dose analysis in the
light of present-day social standards and the Married Women's Statutes.
It is rather pointless to argue that suits for personal torts between
husband and wife must be prohibited in5 the interests of preserving the
peace and harmony of the home when suits between those parties are
uniformly permitted in other fields.' 7 To say that there is an adequate
remedy in the criminal or divorce courts is to ignore the facts. There
allowances taken by H during the period of a marriage later annulled; what has
been done during a de facto marriage cannot be undone); Fowke v. Fowke, [1938]
Ch. 774, 2 All Eng. 638 (annulment of a marriage because of W's impotency was not
allowed to defeat a separation agreement made by H and W during the voidable
marriage).
"25 1 N. Y. 1,9,166 N. E. 783, 786, 65 A. L. R. 244, 249 (1929): "The decree of
annulment destroyed the marriage from the beginning as a source of rights and
duties ... but it could not obliterate the past and make events unreal." Query,
whether it is not obliterating the past to deny W the right to sue for injuries committed upon her by H, and whether ruling that W has no cause of action for the
tort committed against her by H is not making events unreal.
"Maine v. S. Maine and Sons, 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 20, 37 A. L. R. 161
(1924); Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934); Courtney v. Courtney, 184
Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 66o (1939).
1
Broaddus v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 6oi, 136 S. W. (2d) so52 (1940); Austin v.
Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 1o So. 591 (1924); Lindley v. Cusson, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 516 (1940).

uLeonardi v. Leonardi,

21

Ohio App. iio,

153

N. E. 93

(1925);

Courtney v.

Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 66o (1939).
22 Bishop, Law of Married Women (1875) § 331.
"Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S.Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. i8o (sgo);
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877).
1"Farage, Recovery for Torts between Spouses (1934) lo Ind. L. J. 29o; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 142 Mo. App. 481, 127 S.W. 118 (sg9o) (contract); Copp v.
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are many torts which neither criminal nor divorce courts .recognize as
the basis for an action;1 8 and even if successful in a criminal or divorce
action, the injured party gets no recompense for the injuries suffered.
This is particularly true in cases of annulment where, except by statute
in a few states, 19 alimony is not granted. 20 Thus, the injured party is
truly without remedy.
The Married Women's Statutes, enacted in practically all states,
have wiped out the archaic principle of the unity of husband and wife
in all fields except that of personal torts. 2 1 The wife having been given

the right to own property and enforce her own causes of action, the rule
of the common law that her causes of action became her husband's
upon marriage no longer applies; and by the very fact that the unity
of husband and wife is gone, the nature of the relationship is no longer
such as to prevent the arising of a cause of action between them. It
would seem that reliance upon this factor as preventing the allowance
of recovery by one spouse for the injuries inflicted by the other is blind
adherence to a principle of the common law which has long since
become outmoded.
Some courts have, in fact.4 begun to accept the force of the Married Women's Statutes as allowing suits between husband and wife for
personal torts.2 2 In regard to this question, the statutes in effect in
the various states are of four general types: (i) those granting the
wife a separate estate in property and the right to sue thereon, (2)
those expressly denying husband and wife the right to sue each other,
(3) those permitting wife to sue and be sued as if a femme sole, and
(4) those expressly permitting suits between husband and wife for
any causes. No great problem is presented under the first, second and
Copp, 1o Me. 51, 68 At. 458 (1907) (debt); Jones v. Jones, i9 Iowa 236 (1865) (replevin); Smith v. Smith, 2o R. I. 556, 4o At. 417 (1898) (trover).
It should be noticed here that all of these states are in the majority group to
allow H and W suits for personal tort. For states in this group see Notes (192o) 6
A. L. R. 1038; (1924) 29 A. L. R. 1482; (1934) 89 A. L. R. 118; (1946) 16o A. L. R.
1406; Note (1936) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 37.
IsNote (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 387.
"Conn. Gen State. (1930) § 5188; Iowa Code (1946) § 598.24; N. H. Rev. Laws
(1942) c. 339, §§ 16, 19.
"'2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation (1891) § 855.
21
Some states by statute expressly permit suits between H and W for personal
torts, and a minority of others construe their statutes to permit such. See text at
note 22 and following. For states in the minority group see A. L. R. annotations cited
in note 17, supra.
2Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn.
42, 89 At. 889 (1914); Note (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 389.
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fourth types as to personal torts, such suits being impliedly or expressly denied in the first and second, and expressly permitted in the
fourth. The biggest problem arises under the third, and very common,
type of statute. In construing these statutes, a majority of the courts
still insist, whether the action was brought during coverture or after
divorce, that suits are not permitted between husband and wife for
personal torts23-this, in spite of the fact that the same courts almost
uniformly permit suits between those parties for torts to property and
on contract rights.24 An increasing minority permits suits between
husband and wife for personal torts, 25 construing the statutes as simply
preventing marriage from changing the woman's rights.20 Under this
view, the application of the statute is not a matter of granting a new
cause of action, but merely of preserving any cause which would exist
for an unmarried woman.
The cases involving suits brought after the marriage has been dissolved by divorce or annulment obviously present no problem under
the minority interpretation, since suits are allowed between husband
and wife even during coverture. 27 But, under the majority interpretation of the statutes, the courts read into the statutes an exception
that is not otherwise discernible, in holding that the disability of coverture is removed in all respects except for personal torts suits. 28 This
construction ignores the apparent intent of the legislatures as exSee A. L. R. annotations cited in note 17, supra.

4

- Note (1926) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 37.

2See A. L. R. annotations cited in note 17, supra.
11
rown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 889 (i9t4); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H.
4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 2o9 N. W. 475 (1926).
2
'Even in these minority jurisdictions, the effect of a guest statute is to bar
recovery by the injured spouse for injuries received as a result of the negligent operation of an automobile by the other spouse. Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669,
1O1 S. W. (2d) 961 (1937). This will, a fortiori, apply is cases of annulment of the
marriage, and there will be no recovery regardless of the type of Married Women's
Statute.
21
8 n view of the almost universal use or requirement of liability insurance by
the owners of automobiles, it would seem that the majority of the courts are basing their denial of liability in these cases on the disability of coverture and are refusing to give any weight to the right of indemnification of the insured.
However, one court in an incidental dictum said, "We can conceive of circumstances where liability insurance, carried by the husband, might prove the moving
factor and not at all disrupt the connubial bliss in collecting from an insurance
campany." Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N. W. 305, 3o6 (1927).
In Coster v. Coster, 239 N. Y. 438, 46 N. E. (2d) 509 (1943), the court said that
the mere fact that the husband will be indemnified does not give the injured wife
any right of action. In this particular field there is a strong underlying policy against
allowing husband and wife suits because of the strong possibility of and opportunity
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pressed in the statutes,2 9 and falls back on the old doctrine of unity
of the spouses to uphold what is considered to be wise public policy.30
Since the courts have seen fit to abandon logical reasoning and go to
such extremes to avoid the intent of the statutes in cases of divorce,
they will in all probability continue this practice in cases of annulment.
* The solutions to the problem of whether to permit husband-andwife suits for personal torts run all the way from the suggestion of
abolishing all suits between husband and wife-which would be highly
impractical since the states almost uniformly allow such suits in protection of property and contract rights-to the very logical solution
of allowing suits between spouses for all types of torts, while freely
imposing the theories of "license," "voluntary assumption of risk,"
"implied consent," and "joint purpose" to bar unwarranted recoveries.3 1 The imposition of these theories would eliminate the deluge of
trivial suits between disgruntled spouses, and at the same time permit
greater justice to married women with bona fide claims for damages.
JOHN

B. RUSSELL

EQUITY-AvAILABILITY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE REMEDY To ENFORCE

CONTRACT To SELL NEW AUTOMOBILE. [Kansas]
Postwar scarcities of consumer goods which are normally readily
available on the open market have produced legal consequences in the
form of a new challenge to the restrictive rule against granting specific
performance of a contract to sell chattels. It is "well-settled" law that
for collusion against the insurance companies. Gen. Accid. Fire & Life Assur. Corp.
v. Morgan, 33 F. Supp. 19o (W. D. N. Y. 1940); McCurdy, Torts between Persons
in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1o3o. This is demonstrated by the
fact that the legislature of New York passed a statute excluding the wife from the
coverage of the husband's liability insurance policy unless specifically included, at
the same time it passed the statute permitting husband and wife suits for personal
torts. Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 258 App. Div. 603 (194o); 2 N. Y.
Consolidated Laws (Baldwin, 1938), Domestic Relations Law, art. 4, § 57, and Vol.
3, Insurance Law, art. 2, § 1o9, subd. 3-a.
2'See Justice Harlan's dissent concurred in by Justices Holmes and Hughes in
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 619, 31 S. Ct. 111, 113, 54 L. ed. ii8o, 1183
(1910).
'OIt is difficult to deduce the facts upon which this wise public policy is supposedly based, since in the states allowing such suits, there has not been any great
deluge of suits between husbands and wives, as it has been prophesied there would
be, nor has any greater amount of domestic animosity been observed. McCurdy, Torts
between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. io3o.
1
3Vernier, American Family Law (1935) § i8o; McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030.
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the vendee cannot generally obtain specific performance of a promise
to sell personalty, because the damages at law for breach of such a contract are ordinarily adequate, inasmuch as an award of money damages
puts the plaintiff in position to purchase the same kind of chattels to
take the place of those the defendant failed to deliver.1 However, exceptions to the general rule are recognized where damages are inadequate because the chattel has some special value to the plaintiff over
and above its intrinsic value, 2 or the chattel is rare or unique,3 or an4
other article of the same type is not conveniently available elsewhere.
During the past three years, a number of suits for specific performance of contracts to sell new automobiles have required the courts to
adapt these familiar principles to unfamiliar circumstances. As was to
be expected, the results have not been uniform.5 In Heidner v. Hewitt
Chevrolet Co.,6 the Supreme Court of Kansas recently adopted a progressive, though definitely a minority view, and granted the vendee
specific enforcement of a contract to sell a new automobile. Plaintiff
had deposited $1oo with the defendant company, had received a receipt stating that the deposit was on a new car, and had been given a
number to designate his position of priority in relation to other prospective purchasers of cars. About ig months later the defendant informed the plaintiff that a car had arrived which he might have. After
plaintiff accepted it in fulfillment of the contract, and offered to pay
the balance of the purchase price, he was told that in addition to the
payment of the purchase price, he would be required to deliver a used
car or "trade-in" to the defendant before he could secure delivery of
the new car. No such condition having been agreed upon, plaintiff
refused to comply, and rejected defendant's offer to return the deposit.
"'So, courts of equity will not generally decree performance of a contract for
the sale of stock or goods; not because of their personal nature, but because the
damages at law ... are as complete a remedy for the purchaser, as the delivery
of the stock or goods contracted for; inasmuch as with the damages he may ordinarily purchase the same quantity of the like stock or goods." i Story, Equity Jurisprudence (12th ed. 1877) 704.
2
Adams v. Messinger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888); Beasley v. Allyn, 15
Phila. 97 (Pa. 1882). Also see Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 351.
TChamber of Commerce v. Barton, 195 Ark. 274, 112 S. W. (2d) 61g (1937);
Elliott v. Jones, ii Del. Ch. 283, 1o Ad. 872 (1917); Summers v. Bean, 13 Gratt.

404 (Va. 1856).
'American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Bunker Hill & S. Min. & Concentrating Co.,
248 Fed. 172 (D. C. Ore. 1918); Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 N. J. Eq. 831, 66 Atl. 935
(19o7); Strause v. Berger, 220 Pa. 367, 69 Ad. 818 (19o8).
"See text at notes 7 and 8, infra.
0199 P. (2d) 481 (Kan. 1948).
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The Kansas court, decreeing specific performance of the contract, went
against the clear weight of recent authority on this point. Ten decisions have denied the vendee's right to specific performance while only
two reported cases have allowed equitable relief.8
A number of the courts which have denied the vendee the benefit
of the equitable remedy refused to recognize any inadequacy in the
remedy at law consisting of damages. 9 Thus, in Welch v. Chippewa
Sales Co., the Wisconsin court was satisfied to observe that, "In spite
of the failure of production fully to meet the demands of customers,
automobiles, and indeed, the very make and type of automobile ordered
by plaintiff in this case, are being produced by the thousands." 10 Thereby the court felt it had clearly shown that an automobile, though difficult to purchase on the open market, was not the type of unique
chattel required to allow a decree of specific performance. In one instance, a court, while denying specific performance, conceded that the
plaintiff might have been given relief if he had shown that, due to the
condition of the market he would be unable to obtain a comparable article elsewhere, or would incur serious inconvenience in procuring it
elsewhere."
In other cases specific performance has been denied on the ground
12
that the contract entered into between the parties was too indefinite.
7McCallister v. Patton, 215 S. W. (2d) 701 (Ark. 1948); Kelly v. Creston Buick
Sales Co., 34 N. W. (2d) 598 (Iowa 1948); Poltorak v. Jackson Chevrolet Co., 322
Mass. 669, 79 N. E. (2d) 285 (1948); Kirsch v. Zubalsky, 139 N. J. Eq. 22, 49 A. (2d)
773 (1946); Gellis v. Falcon Buick Co., 76 N. Y. S. (2d) 94 (1947); Daub v. Henry Caplan, Inc., 70 N. Y. S. (2d) 837 (1946); Kaliski v. Grole Motors, Inc., 69 N. Y. S. (2d)
645 (1946); Goodman v. Henry Caplan, Inc.. 188 Misc. 242, 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 576
(1946); Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc., 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 481 (1946); Welch v.
Chippewa
Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 31 N. W. (2d) 170 (1948).
8
Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 199 P. (2d) 481 (Kan. 1948); DeMoss v. Con-

art Motor Sales, Inc., 72 N. E. (2d) 158 (Ohio 1947).
OMcCallister v. Patton, 215 S. W. (2d) 701 (Ark. 1948); Poltorak v. Jackson
Chevrolet Co., 322 Mass. 699, 79 N. E. (2d) 285 (1948); Kirsch v. Zubalsky, 139 N. J.
Eq. 22, 49 A. (2d) 773 (1946); Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 31 N. W.
(2d)170 (1948).
10252 Wis. 166, 31 N. W. (2d) 170, 171 (1948).
UPoltorak v. Jackson Chevrolet Co., 322 Mass. 669, 79 N..E. (2d) 285 (1948). In
view of this statement by the court, it is interesting to note the facts of the case.
The plaintiff had traded in his old car as a down payment on the new one and
therefore was deprived of its use while awaiting delivery of the new automobile. A]so it appeared that the plaintiff was employed in a neighboring town, so that he had
to commute to work each day. Yet, the court evidently felt this was not the type of
"serious inconvenience" the plaintiff must show in order to be entitled to specific
performance.
12
Kelly v. Creston Buick Sales Co., 34 N. W. (2d) 598 (Iowa 1948); Daub v.
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In Kelly v. Creston Buick Sales Co.,13 the contract was typical, in that
it consisted of a printed order-form wherein the delivery date was
stated to be "as soon as possible," and the price was to be "the price
effective on the day of delivery." The Supreme Court of Iowa, in a 6-3
decision, ruled that these terms were too indefinite to allow specific
performance, citing in support of this proposition a case in which indefiniteness appears to have been only an incidental ground for the
decision. 14 Lack of mutuality of contract was another reason given in
the Kelly case to support the denial of a specific enforcement decree.
By the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff could cancel the order and
receive his deposit back if the price was changed to an unsatisfactory
figure.1 5
In the principal case, rather than approaching the problem from
the standpoint of the uniqueness of a specified make of automobile,
the court preferred to ascertain whether damages were in any sense
inadequate. This approach led to the conclusion that it was highly
improbable that such a car could be obtained on the open market for
cash, and that though the chattel was not unique in the sense that
there was a dearth of such articles, it was unique in the sense that
there was a dearth of such articles reasonably available to the plaintiff.16 Indeed, the court felt constrained to take judicial notice of the
Henry Caplan, Inc., 7o N. Y. S. (2d) 837 (1946); Goodman v. Henry Caplan, Inc.,
i88 Misc. 242, 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 576 (1946).
1334

N. W. (2d) 598 (Iowa 1948).

"4Kirsch v. Zubalsky, 139 N. J. Eq. 22, 49 A. (2d) 773 (1946). The New Jersey court's
principal ground for denying specific performance seems dearly to have been the
adequacy of damages. To substantiate this reasoning, the court referred to the contract term regarding the price of the new automobile, which stated that the "O.P.A."
price on the date of delivery was to govern. This, the court felt, was the proper
measure of the plaintiff's damages and showed that the plaintiff had, in effect, agreed
on this figure as the monetary value of the automobile to him. In the last paragraph of the opinion the court then asserted that the contract was too indefinite
because the price could not be ascertained since the "O.P.A.," the criterion set out
in the contract, had now been dissolved. It would seem from this apparent inconsistency that the "indefiniteness" argument is of the "make-weight" variety and
not an integral part of an otherwise well-considered opinion.
'15The clause giving the power of cancellation to the vendee states that "...the
price ... is subject to change without notice ....I, however, have the privilege of
cancelling this order, provided the changed price is not satisfactory...." The dis-

senting opinion points out that the defendant admitted in argument that this
clause implied the existence of an agreed-upon original price and that since here
there was no such price, this provision could never become opeative. Kelly v.
Creston Buick Sales Co., 34 N. W. (2d) 598, 6oi (Iowa 1948).
"The court reasoned that "If... it is made to appear to the court that like
chattels cannot be readily purchased on the market at the time specified in the con-

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

scarcity, which was a fact of common knowledge in virtually all communities in 1948.
The contract in the principal case was open to the same objection of
indefiniteness raised successfully in several of the cases denying specific
performance, yet the court here refused to withhold equitable relief
on that ground. It was felt that although there was some indefiniteness
as to model, price, and date of delivery, these facts were easily ascertainable, and that at the time the plaintiff was shown the car and accepted it, all uncertainty had been resolved. It was reasoned that, "If
the contract is certain, complete and has mutuality on the day remedy
is invoked or suit is filed, specific performance will not be refused because of a lack of completeness, certainly and mutuality at a prior
date."17
The fact that a specific automobile had been agreed upon in the
Heidner case seems insufficient to distinguish it from the cases denying specific performance because of indefiniteness. The language in
those latter cases indicates that the courts regarded the contracts under consideration to be so indefinite as to be unenforceable in any
event.' s
In the case of DeMoss v. Conant Motor Sales,19 the only other reported case found allowing specific performance, the contract date of
delivery was "as soon as possible." The court held that this provision
was tantamount to postponing delivery a "reasonable time" under the
circumstances, and then ruled that this "reasonable time" had elapsed.
Further, the court in the DeMoss case ruled adversely to the claim
of the defendant that the contract lacked mutuality because of the
provision that the buyer could cancel the purchasing agreement at his
tract for delivery of the chattel, specific performance will generally be granted if
the other necessary elements are present." Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 199 P.
(2d) 481, 483 (Kan. 1948).
17Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., gg P. (2d) 481, 483 (Kan. 1948).
181t does not appear from the opinions in the cases denying specific performance
because of indefiniteness whether or not there was at the time suit was instituted a
car meeting the specifications of the contract in the possession of the defendant,
although in most of these cases it was so alleged by the plaintiff; and if in fact there
was no such car in defendant's possession, the futility of the remedy sought is clear,
and the denial of relief should have been based on that ground. The true inquiry
in this regard seems to be as to what point of time definiteness is required. The
principal case indorses the "time for performance" view, whereas in the cases denying equitable relief, a definite contract is required from the very outset. Therefore,
whether the parties ever agreed upon a specific automobile or not would seem immaterial, since the contracts fail to meet the more fundamental requirement of enforceability.
1D72 N. E. (2d) 158 (Ohio 1947).
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pleasure, the seller in this event retaining the down payment. The decision in this respect seems to be beyond attack, inasmuch as this agreement, in effect, constituted an option of a type which is almost universally recognized as valid where specific performance is requested of a
contract, created by the timely exercise of the option, to transfer legal
title to realty.20 Therefore, this feature of the agreement, assuming the
existence of the other factors necessary to allow specific performance,
should in no way be destructive of the otherwise enforceable contract.
A contention unsuccessfully raised by the plaintiffs in a number of
the cases denying the right to specific performance was that under Section 68 of the Uniform Sales Act, 21 courts of equity are given the discretionary power to compel specific performance of contracts to sell
"specific or ascertained" goods, and that therefore it was within the
power of the court to allow specific performance of the automobile
sales contracts. The holdings of the several courts on this point have
resolved themselves into two stock answers: (1) a contract for the sale
of such an item as a "Studebaker 2 or 4 door sedan" is not a contract
for the sale of a "specified or ascertained" automobile and is too indefinite for enforcement; 22 (2) this provision of the Sales Act relates
to equity's power in a jurisdictional sense to grant specific performance,
and so the remedy at law must still be inadequate, whereas here it is
not.23 The first line of reasoning above appears to require the dealer
and purchaser to contract in reference to a specific automobile, which
is virtually impossible in this type of transaction. The extreme similarity of all cars of the same model, which has been noticed by one
court as a reason for denying specific performance because automobiles are not unique chattels, 24 would appear sufficient to sustain the
application of the doctrine of fungible goods to these cases. Thereby,
any goods on hand of the type ordered by the plaintiff, would satisfy
the "specific goods" requirement of Section 68. Another way to avoid
2OSee 49 Am. Jur. 137-138: "It is well established that when an option which
the owner of property gives to another for the purchase of such property is consummated by acceptance according to its terms within the time specified, it merges
into a contract for the purchase of the property which equity will enforce by specific performance the same as any other contract wherein the requisite elements
of equity jurisdiction are present."
21 U. L. Ann., Sales (1931) § 68.
OGellis v. Falcon Buick Co., 76 N. Y S. (2d) 94 (1947); Kaliski v. Grole Motors,
Inc., 69 N. Y. S. (2d) 645 (1946); Goodman v. Henry Caplan, Inc., 188 Misc. 242, 65
N. Y. S. (2d) 576 (1946); Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc., 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 481 (1946).
"McCallister v. Patton, 215 S. W. (2d) 701 (Ark. 1948); Welch v. Chippewa
Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 31 N. W. (2d) 170 (1948).
2
See text at note 1o, supra.
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the indefiniteness objection is to look at the contract as of the time for
performance, as suggested by the court in the principal case. 25 When
the buyer's date of delivery arrived, judged either by his priority in relation to other prospective purchasers, or within a "reasonable" time
after placing his order, the next car that the dealer received of the type
ordered by the plaintiff would be the specific chattel required by the
Sales Act.
The principal decision, by avoiding the technical obstacles which
most of the courts have allowed to paralyze their powers of granting
relief in this type of case, has made a feasible application of the modern
theory that equity should give specific performance in any case where
26
the remedy is more satisfactory than the action at law for damages.
The result seems particularly desirable in view of the fact that the
automobile market has been the subject of much controversy in re27
cent years and has even been under congressional investigation.
Any reasonable judicial measures tending to dissipate "sharp practice"
and to require the contracting parties to live up to their contracts
would seem to be justifiable both from a policy standpoint and as a
purely mechanical matter regarding the proper exercise of equity's
jurisdiction where specific performance of a contract to sell personalty
28
is requested.
W. H. JOLLY
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF DECEASED'S GOOD CHARACTER
IN HOMICIDE

CASE IN WHICH ACCUSED RELIES ON SELF-DEFENSE.

[Virginia]
It is a generally accepted rule of evidence that in a homicide case
the defendant cannot bring into evidence proof of the violent or
dangerous character of the deceased,' and, conversely, that evidence of
2See text at note 17, supra.
"The inherent superiority of specific relief, giving to the purchaser exactly
what the contract calls for, over damages based on his seeking like goods elsewhere,
with the attendant trouble involved and the uncertainty of being able actually to
collect a judgment for damages, gives an extensive field for the broadening of specific performance...."Walsh, Equity (1930) 3o6. See also i Story, Equity Jurisprudence (12th ed. 1877) §§ 717-717a.
2-See Richmond Times Dispatch, Nov. 11, 1948, Vol. 98, No. 36, p. 1.
2For a further discussion of this topic in accord with the views here expressed,
see Note (1948) 62 Harv.L. Rev. 149.
'Lang v. State, 84 Ala. 1,4 So. 193 (1888); Weaver v. State, 2oo Ga. 598, 37 S. E.
(2d) 802 (1946); Dock v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 909 (Va. 1872); Mealy v. Commonwelath, 135 Va. 585, 115 S.E. 528 (1923).
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deceased's peaceful nature is inadmissible on the part of the state.2 In
3
such a situation the character of the deceased is considered immaterial.
A notable exception to this rule is presented where the defendant
pleads self-defense, 4 for in that case he may, after laying a proper
foundation for this plea,5 introduce evidence of deceased's dangerous
character. 6 However, when the plea of self-defense is entered, the question arises as to when the state may introduce evidence of deceased's
good character-that is, may it immediately offer proof of good
character, or must it wait until after the defendant has actually introduced proof of deceased's bad character?
In Lee v. Commonwealth,7 a recent Virginia case of first impression,
such a situation was presented. The defendant, accused of homicide,
entered a plea of self-defense, and the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence of deceased's good reputation. Objection was made
by the defendant, but it was overruled and exception was taken. The
defendant contended that such evidence was admissible only after he
had attacked the character of deceased and then only to rebut this attack. The Commonwealth successfully contended at the trial that the
plea of self-defense was a sufficient attack to permit it to show the
deceased's good character. In reversing the trial court on this issue, the
Supreme Court of Appeals held that only after the accused attacks the
deceased's character by attempting to prove the reputation of the de2

People v. Hoffman, 195 Cal. 295, 232 Pac. 974 (1925); Buttree v.Commonwealth,
242 Ky. 623, 47 S. W. (2d) 73 (1932); Dock v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 909 (Va.
1872).

3State v. Champion,

cide §

222

N. C. x6o, 22 S. E. (2d) 232

(1942);

13 R. C. L., Homi-

219.

'The terms "plead self-defense" and "plea of self-defense," commonly employed
in the courts' opinions in the cases cited hereafter, are not to be construced in the
technical sense of formal pleadings, but only as indicating that particular defense
or that particular issue supported by prima facie evidence. Furthermore, since the
defendant must always introduce at least prima facie evidence in support of his
claim of self-defense, and, since the issue of self-defense must be raised before the
deceased's character becomes relevant, evidence of the deceased's good character
cannot be introduced until the state offers its rebuttal.
5It appears that at least a prima facie case of self-defense must usually be made
out; however, the courts are not entirely agreed as to just what constitutes a proper
foundation. For a collection of authorities on this point see Notes L. R. A. 1916A
1245, 1255; (1929) 64 A. L. R. 1032, 1036.
'Smith v. United States, 161 U. S. 85, 16 S. Ct. 483, 40 L. ed. 626 (1896); State v.
Padula, it6 Conn. 454, 138 Atl. 456 (1927); Weaver v. State, 2oo Ga. 598, 37 S. E.
(2d) 802 (1946); State v. Wilson, 236 Iowa 429, 19 N. W. (2d) 232 (1945); State v.
Champion, 222 N. C. 16o, 22 S. E. (2d) 232 (1942); Harrison v. Commonwealth, 79
Va. 374 (1884).
188 Va. 360, 49 S. E. (2d) 6o8 (1948).
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ceased for violence and turbulence may the Commonwealth show that
the deceased had the reputation of a peaceful, law abiding man; and
the plea of self-defense is not, in and of itself, an attack on the character
of the deceased such as will warrant rebutting evidence by the state.
Though the rule of the principal case is supported by a clear majority of courts in other jurisdictions, there is authority advocating the
admissibility of such evidence on the part of the state as soon as the
plea of self-defense is made.8 The usual reason (which seems to be
more a statement of conclusion than of reason) given for this view is
that the plea of self-defense is sufficient to amount to a direct attack on
the presumed good character of the deceased and this attack may be
rebutted by the state. 9 Another reason claimed by some to be the logical solution to the problem, is that since the defendant may introduce evidence of his own good character, and since the deceased's
character has now been opened to the possibility of attack by virtue of
the plea of self-defense, the deceased should have the privilege of showing his own good character. 10 However, in only two jurisdictions has
the bare plea of self-defense been found sufficient to warrant the state
to include in its evidence in chief proof of the deceased's good character.11 In other cases apparently supporting this view it will be noticed
that there were other facts from which the jury could infer that the de8
Thrawley v. State, 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95 (1899); Ferguson v. State 138 Tenn.
lo6, 196 S. W. 140 (1917); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 194o) § 63.
TFerguson v. State, 138 Tenn. io6, 196 S. W. 140 (1917). In Thrawley v. State,
153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95, 98 (1899), it was asserted that "the evidence of appellant
in support of the charge against deceased was such an attack upon his character

for peace as to authorize the state to introduce his good character... in disproof of

the charge ......
'IGn State v. Holbrook, 98 Ore. 43, 188 Pac. 947, 954 (1920), it was said: "In a
sense, it was an issue whether or not [deceased] was about to violate the law, and
his reputation [for peaceableness] would tend to disprove that charge. In principle
it is the same as the testimony adduced by the defendants in their own favor on the
same feature." Petition for rehearing of this case was denied in State v. Holbrook,

98 Ore. 43,

192

Pac. 640

(1920).

However, the court, by way of dicta

(192

Pac.

640, 647), pointed out that the rule of State v. Wilkins, 72 Ore. 77, 87, 142 Pac. 589,
592 (1914), relied on by the trial court, which allowed the state to show that the deceased was a peaceable person to overcome the contention of defendant that he
acted in self-defense against an attack by decedent, was too broad, but neverthe-

less, must be followed in this case because it was the law of the jurisdiction at the
time of the tiral, of the instant case. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) § 246,
also in support of this rule.
uThrawley v. State, 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95 (1899); Ferguson v. State, 138
Tenn. 1o6, 196 S. W. 140 (1917). This rule is also supported by Wigmore at two places
in his treatise: i Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 63, and 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d
ed. 1940 § 246. Many authorities also include Oregon as following this rule, citing
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ceased was a dangerous man, thus warranting rebuttal by the state.' 2
More persuasive and practical reasoning, however, is available to
sustain the majority view, now adopted by the Virginia court. It is to
be noted, first, that aside from the self-defense factor, evidence of the
deceased's character is generally not admissible at all in homicide
cases.' 3 Thus the plea of self-defense, in effect, amounts to a condition
precedent to the introduction of any such evidence.' 4 Since this plea
only opens the door to the possibility of an attack, the assertion that
it alone constitutes an actual attack on the deceased's presumed good
character is hardly accurate.' 5 Therefore, since the deceased's character
is still presumed to be good, if it is to be brought into issue at all, the
defendant should be the party to make the first move by introducing
evidence to overcome the presumption,' 6 as distinguished from merely
entering a plea which makes it possible to introduce such evidence.
The argument that since the defendant has the right to show his
own good character as part of his evidence in chief, therefore the deceased, through the state, should have the privilege of showing the deceased's good character, is open to the practical objection that it would
State v. Holbrook, 98 Ore. 43, i88 Pac. 947

(1920). However, for a discussion of the
situation in that jurisdiction see not 9, supra.
"Where defendant submitted testimony which, if believed by the jury, would
cause them to believe deceased was a violent and dangerous man: Burnett v. State,
34 Ariz. 129, 268 Pac. 6ns, 614 (1928). After evidence of threats by deceased against
defendant had been admitted, deceased's good character was admissible: Thomason
v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 489, 17 S. E. (2d) 374 (1941); State v. Arrington, 88 W.
Va. 152, ,o6 S. E. 445 (1921). In State v. Todd, 28 N. M. 518, 214 Pac. 899, 900
(1923), the court spoke as follows: "Here deceased has been characterized by the
appellant as carrying a gun for him, lying in wait for him, attempting to murder
him.... and threatening to murder him. Deceased's character has been thus attacked and blackened as successfully as could possibly have been done by calling his
neighbors in to testify to his bad character."
'3See notes 1, 2, and 3, supra.
"In State v. Wilson, 236 Iowa 429, 19 N. W. (2d) 232, 237 (1945), it was observed: "Before evidence of this character or trait is admissible there must have
been some preliminary foundation laid...." And see 26 Am. Jur., Homicide § 345:
"The necessary preliminary showing or appearance of a case of self-defense may be
adduced either in the evidence given in behalf of the state in its main case or by
the defendant in his defense; the only indispensible prerequisite is that it precede
the offered evidence of the decedent's charater."
"See Kelly v. People, 229 Ill.81, 82 N. E. 198, 201 (0o7): "... the character of
the deceased ... is presumed to be good until the contrary appears, and unless defendant introduces evidence attacking the general reputation of the deceased in that
respect no evidence upon that subject is admissible; and this is true notwithstanding
self-defense may be interposed and relied upon." See also State v. Reed, 250 Mo.
379, 157 S. W. 316, 318 (1913).
"State v. Potter, 13 Kan. 414 (1874); State v. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292, 36 Pac. "1"9

(1894).
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often confuse the jury with unnecessary collateral issues. 17 Furthermore, this plea of self-defense is not entered for the purpose of placing
a charge against the deceased, but is interposed as a defense to the
charge against the defendant.
In any analysis of this problem it is necessary to keep in mind the
purposes for which evidence of the deceased's character may be shown.
These are two in number and differ widely, a difference which many
courts have failed to notice.
First, such evidence is admissible to show the state of mind of the
defendant.' s This state of mind of the defendant is of probative value
in determining the reasonableness of his apprehension of such violence
at the hands of the deceased as will justify the defensive measures taken
by the defendant. 19 Thus, conduct of the deceased which, when considered independently of his character, would not warrant extreme
defensive measures, might well, when considered in connection with
such character, arouse an apprehension of deadly peril such as would
justify an extreme defense. 20 Obviously, before such evidence can be
offered for this purpose, it must be shown that the defendant had
knowledge of the deceased's character prior to the killing, for without
prior knowledge the defendant would have nothing on which to base
his apprehensions. 21 However, in some cases it has been held that there
22
is a presumption of knowledge of the deceased's character.
The second purpose for which this evidence is admissible is to de'1In State v. Potter, 13 Kan. 414 (1874), Justice Brewer, later a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, said: "Such testimony tends to distract the minds of
the jury from the principal question and should only be admitted when absolutely
essential to the discovery of the truth." And in State v. Reed, 25o Mo. 379, 157 S.W.
316, 318 (1913), it was observed that the admission of such evidence "would open
up a Pandora's box of collateral issues to be let into every case, and thereby confuse juries even more extensively than under our present system."
'8Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14 (1856). 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 246.
2'Smith v. United States, 161 U. S. 85, 88, 16 S. Ct. 483, 484, 40 L. ed. 626, 627
(1896). "...any evidence which, according to the common experience of mankind,
tended to show that the defendant had reasonable cause to apprehend great bodily
harm from the conduct of the deceased towards him just before the killing, was
admissible; ...[including] evidence that the deceased had the general reputation
;" Edwards v. State, 58 Okla. Cr.
of being a quarrelsome and dangerous person ....
15, 48 P. (2d) 1087 (1935); 2 Warren, Homicide (1938) § 46.
2nGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232 (1891).
nPeople v. Hoffman, 195 Cal. 295, 232 Pac. 974 (1925); Catalina v. People. 104
Colo. 585, 93 P - (2d) 897 (1939). In Dannenburg v. Berkner, 118 Ga. 885, 45 S. E.
682, 683 (1903), a civil action for assault, the court pointed out: "If they did not
know of his quarrelsome disposition, it could not explain their conduct. If they
did know thereof, it might have illustrated the motive with which they acted."
'Thrawley v. State, 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95 (1899); Trabune v. Common-
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termine.which party was the aggressor 23-that is, to prove the deceased's
state of mind or character as indicative of a tendency to commit or not
commit acts of aggression. In this situation the element of communication to the defendant is immaterial, "for the question is what the deceased probably did, not what the defendant probably thought the
24
deceased was going to do."
Thus, where the defendant is acquainted with the deceased's character, it follows that this evidence is of probative value for both purposes; but where the defendant has no prior knowledge of the deceased's character it is relevant only in regard to the second purpose:
determining who was the aggressor.
When the principal case is considered in the light of the foregoing
discussion, it appears that the result was clearly correct. However, the
controversy over which rule is to be applied as to when the state may
show the deceased's good character where self-defense is relied on, may
have been irrelevant to the case. Inasmuch as the facts of the case indicated that the defendant and the deceased were complete strangers,
evidence of the deceased's character was admissible only to prove the
deceased's state of mind or character as an aid in determining whether
or not he was the aggressor. But here it was admitted by the Commonwealth that the deceased was the aggressor.2 5 This being an established
fact, evidence showing that the deceased was not in the habit of committing such acts is irrelevant, and particularly so when the admitted
purpose of the Commonwealth in introducing the evidence was only
to rebut an attack on the character of the deceased and thus show that
he was not a person likely to commit an act of aggression.
J. MAURIc E MILLER, JR.

wealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 343, 17 S. W. 186 (x891); Harrison v. Commonwealth, 79 Va.
374, 52 Am. Rep. 634 (1884); 26 Am. Jur., Homicide § 346.
2Williams v. Fambro, 3o Ga. 232 (186o); State v. Wilson, 236 Iowa 429, 19 N. W.
(2d) 232 (1945); McLain v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 373, 188 S. W. 377, 378 (1916),
points out that "where... there is a serious conflict in the evidence as to who was
the aggressor, the defendant has a right, not only to prove the general reputation of
the decedant in these respects, but to present evidence by persons intimately acquainted with him to the effect that that was his nature, character, temperament,

and disposition." Apparently Connecticut is the only jurisdiction flatly denying the
admissibility of such evidence for this purpose, but admtting it for the purpose
of showing defendant's apprehensions: State v. Padula, 1o6 Conn. 454, 138 At. 456
(1927).
24 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) § 63.
"-Lee v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 360, 49 S.E.(2d) 6o8, 611 (1948).
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ON PARENT'S IMMUNITY

[Federal]

The increasing incidence of liability insurance among the general
public has, in recent years, prompted repeated challenges against the
time-honored proposition that the existence of insurance should not
give rise to a cause of action against an insured party in whom the law
generally recognized an immunity from liability.' The practical significance of a reversal of judicial opinion on this issue would obviously
be great in the field of tort liability of charitable institutions, 2 of municipal corporations, 3 and between spouses.4 Some suggestion of a possible breach in the solidarity of the restrictive rule as applied in suits
against eleemosynary organizations is found in a 1947 Illinois case allowing a tort recovery against a charitable hospital on the ground that

"where insurance exists and provides a fund from which tort liability
may be collected so as not to impair the trust fund, the defense of immunity is not available." 5
This basic problem of the effect of liability insurance was recently
presented in a different form of action in Villaret v. Villaret.6 A thirteen year old boy was injured when the automobile in which he was riding, operated by his mother, collided with another car on a highway in
Maryland. Acting through his next friend, the child sued his mother in
the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, for
damages in the sum of $io,ooo. It was stipulated that Mrs. Villaret had
liability insurance in the sum equal to the recovery sought. Her motion to dismiss the complaint as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was denied by the District Court. In reviewing
the case on special appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia stated:
"The existence of liability insurance ought not to create a cause
of action where none exists otherwise. A policy of such insurance
protects against claims legally asserted, but does not itself pro7
duce liability."
As this was a case of first impression under Maryland law, the federal
'Prosser, Torts (1941) 907, 908.
2
Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 6M8, 76 N. E. (2d) 342
3
See Note (1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 3o5.

(1947).

'Coster v. Coster, 289 N. Y. 438, 46 N. E. (2d) 509 (1943).
5Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 634, 76 N. E. (2d) 342, 347 (1947),
noted (1948) 5 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 272.
6169 F. (2d) 677 (App. D. C. 1948).
7169
F. (2d) 677, 678 (App. D. C. 1948).
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court looked to the holdings of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on
kindred questions8 and decided in accord with the generally prevailing rule that public policy forbids tort suits by an unemancipated
child against a parent. 9
While no rule at common law prevented actions between parent
and child for personal torts committed during minority, there is no
case on record in which liability was imposed.10 Since the leading case of
Hewlette v. George" in 1891, a long line of cases has upheld the doctrine that " the peace of society and of families composing society, and
a sound public policy," forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
2
suffered at the hands of the parent.'
In 1923, Chief Justice Clark of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a strong dissenting opinion in the case of Small v. Morrison,'3
gave the first legal expression of a conviction that a suit by a child
against its parent for personal tort should be allowed.' 4 As the protection of the parent by liability insurance appears to have influenced
Justice Clark's views considerably,'5 his opinion serves as a starting
point for an investigation of the decisions in this field during the past
quarter century with a purpose of determining whether liability insurance has had any effect on the application of the established rule
that child cannot sue parent for tort.
Although it ultimately denied recovery, the Michigan Supreme
Court found it necessary to recognize the influence of liability insurance on tort suits by child against parent in Elias v. Collins.16 Chief
Justice Bird stated that there is a "spice of good sense"1 7 to the argu8

Schneider v. Schneider, 16o Md. 18, 152 At. 498 (1930) (suit by a mother
against her infant son; Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 Atl. 534 (1927)
(suit by a wife against her husband).

0Hewlette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682 (891); Small v.
Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, xi8 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135 (1923); McKelvey v. McKelvey, iii Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664, 64 L. R. A. 991 (19o3); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 68 L. R. A. 893 (19o5); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 26o, 212
N. W. 787, 52 A. L. R. 1113 (1927).
"McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relation (1930) 43 Harv. L.

Rev.

1o3o,

io6o.

168 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887, iS L. R. A. 682, 684 (1891).
12McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev.
103o, 1o63-1069.
's185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135 (1923).
uSee Note (1923) 33 Yale L. J. 3x5, 319.
5See Note (1923) 33 Yale L. J. 315, 320.
1-237 Mich. 175, 211 N. W. 88, 52 A. L. R. 118 (1926).
'237 Mich. 175, 211 N. W. 88, 89, 52 A. L. R. 1118, 1122 (1926). Chief Justice
Bird dissented on grounds other than the effect of liability insurance.
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ment that business methods have so changed with the coming of the
automobile and insurance thereon, that the common law rule should
be modified to allow minors to recover for torts inasmuch as the insurance companies promise to reimburse the insured for any judgment
obtained against him for injuries caused by the automobile. Though
Justice Bird seemed to favor a change from the common law rule, he
felt that "if the rule is to go out or be modified, we think it should be
done by the legislature rather than by us."' 8
In Wick v. Wick, 19 Justice Crownhart also looked to the practical
effect of liability insurance and wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion,
favoring the right of the child to sue the parent where the parent was
covered by liability insurance. He stated:
"Times have changed. Practically no business is now carried on
without insurance to protect the owner against his negligence
whereby his employees may be damaged. Practically all owners
of automobiles protect themselves in the same way. Certainly
all prudent men should guard against liability in such cases.
Should a man think less of his own flesh and blood than of his
employees or the stranger on the highway? And if he is thoughtful enough to insure against misfortune due to his negligence to
the public at large, must the court step in and deny the infant
member of his family the same chance in life as is possessed by
20
the public? I think not."
On a special state of facts, the Virginia court in Worrell v. Worrell2 ' found a means of allowing recovery to an injured child. A twenty
year old daughter, who was injured while riding in a bus owned by
her father and operated by one of his employees, was awarded damages
in a tort action against her father. The express basis of the holding was
the fact that the tort complained of was committed by a parent in his
vocational capacity, that the State of Virginia provided for compulsory
indemnity insurance to passengers of a common carrier, and that such
insurance removed all reasons for immunity. The court seemed to
feel that these facts distinguished this case from the ordinary tort action of a child against its parents. The opinion emphasized the influence of compulsory insurance and stressed the fact that the father was
in the performance of duties as carrier and not in the parental relation
when the injuries were occasioned. But though the court reiterated the
prevailing rule that "an insurance policy creates no cause of action
18237 Mich. 175,
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N. WT. 88, 89, 52 A.L.R. 1118, 1122 (1926).

"192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 52 A. L. R. 1113 (1927).
2192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 790, 52 A.L.R. m3, mii8
(1927).

"174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.(2d) 343 (1939).
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where no cause of action exists in the absence of insurance," it went
on to state that "liability insurance, while it does not, therefore, affect
the merits of the cause of action against the insured, does lessen the
effect of the liability on the wrongdoer." 22 Reminiscent of the language of Justice Crownhart's dissent 23 is the observation of Justice
Spratley, speaking for the majority of the Virginia court:
"Can it be that his duties to other passengers are higher than his
obligations to his own child, when his interest, her interest and
the interest of the State all require the preservation and protec24
tion of her rights?"
In Lusk v. Lusk,25 a 1932 West Virginia case, the facts were very
similar to those of the Worrell case and a recovery was allowed. The
court placed considerable emphasis upon the fact that the parent
was protected by insurance in a vocational capacity, and pointed out
that the existence of the insurance took away the reason for the common law rule forbidding a suit by a minor child against its parents
under the maxim when the reason for a rule ceases, the rule itself
ceases. The court declared:
"There is no reason for applying the rule in the instant case.
This action is not unfriendly as between the daughter and the
father. A recovery by her is no loss to him. In fact, their interests
unite in favor of her recovery, but without hint of 'domestic
fraud and collusion' (charged in some cases). There is no
filial recrimination and no pitting of the daughter against the
father in this case. No strained family relation will follow. On
the contrary, the daughter must honor the father for attempting
to provide compensation against her 26misfortune. Family harmony is assured instead of disrupted."
Though both this and the Virginia case are possibly distinguishable on their facts from the general type of situation in which recovery
is denied, both decisions in denying immunity to the insurance company lean heavily on the theory that the reason for the rule is gone
and the rule should not apply.
In the case of Dunlap v. Dunlap,2 7 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire allowed a minor son to recover against his father for injuries sustained through collapse of a staging, while the son was workVa. 11, 27, 4 S. E. (2d) 343, 350 (1939).
20, supra.
-174 Va. 11, 27, 4 S. E. (2d) 343, 349 (1939).
211 3 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538, 122 A. L. R. 1357 (1932).
" 13 W. Va. 17, 19, 166 S. E. 538, 539, 122 A. L. R. 1357, 1358 (1932).
2184 N. H. 352, 15o At. 905, 7V A. L. R. 1055 0930).
2174

2See text at note
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ing for his father. The father carried employer's liability insurance 28
and the insurance agent knew that the son was employed. In a forthright manner, the court presents the practical reasoning favoring recovery by the minor child, and the convincing language of the opinion
appears logical and sound:
"As often stated before, the sole debatable excuse advanced for
the denial of the child's right to sue is the effect a suit would
have upon discipline and family life. If, therefore, the situation
is such that the suit will not affect those matters at all, the reason
for the theory fails,
and it should not be applied. There is such
29
a situation here."
"It will be said that the father's act in taking out insurance
against personal liability cannot create the liability where none
existed before. The act which creates the liability, or, more correctly, removes a barrier to the enforcement of a right, is the
parent's removal of the element which therefore impaired
8 0
the right."
Thus, the court in the Dunlap case completely broke away from
the long line of authority which denies recovery, and the practical approach taken by the New Hampshire court is favored by some Law Review authority3 ' and by at least one authoritive text writer.8 2 However, it has failed to gain much headway in the courts. In the many
instances in which the question has been considered from Small v.
Morrison in 1923 to Villaret v. Villaret in 1948, an overwhelming majority of the courts have endorsed the view that the presence of liability insurance should not create a cause of action where none otherwise exists.83 Despite the widespread use of liability insurance most
courts have clung steadfastly to the principle that public policy denies
Although Workmen's Compensation Insurance is more analagous to casualty
insurance than liability insurance, the court treats the insurance here as liability
insurance.
"'84 N. H. 352, s5o At. 905, 912, 71 A. L. R. 1055, 1o67 (1930). The court further said: "In fact, if not in law ... the insurer became the party liable. More and
more such insurance is being looked upon as for the protection of the sufferer,
rather than as reimbursement to the wrongdoer." 84 N. H. 352, 15o At. 905, 913, 71
A. L. R. 1055, io68 (193o); "But the essential fact which establishes the suability
of the father is that he has provided for satisfying the judgment in some way which
removes the suit from the class promotive of family discord." 84 N. H. 352, 15o At.
905, 913, 71 A. L. R. 1055, xo69 (1930).
'084 N. H. 352, 15O Atl. 905, 912, 71 A. L. R. 1055, io67 (1930).
"'See Note (1933) ig Va. L. Rev. 730, 732.
"2Prosser, Torts (1941) 9o6- 9o8.
"Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S. W. (2d) 468 (1938); Lund v. Olson, 183
Minn. 619, 237 N. W. 188 (1931); Norfolk Southern v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174
S. E. 841 (1934); Securo v. Securo, 11o W. Va. 1, 156 S. E. 750 (1931).

1949]

CASE COMMENTS

recovery of child against parent.3 4 Though the practical arguments for
the abolition of the rule appear to have considerable merit, the roots
of stare decisis in this field of the law are too deep to permit an alteration of the law by judicial action. Most courts feel that the danger of
fraud and collusion, which is present in all liability insurance cases, is
35
considerably increased in suits between parent and child. If the pre-

valence of liability insurance at the present time calls for any change
in the common law rule, the courts generally have concluded it is a
matter for the legislature rather than the judiciary.3 6
RuFus B. HAILEY

MORTGAGES-EFFECT OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF STATUTE PROVIDING FOR REDUCTION OF MORTGAGE DEBT BY AMOUNT OF "FAIR MARKET VALUE" OF PROPERTY. [Pennsylvania]
1
Though in the earlier development of mortgages, neither the law
nor equity2 courts recognized the right of a mortgagee to a deficiency

"In addition to public policy, the courts further consider the effect on the relationship of parent and child of the cooperation clause which is usually included
in liability insurance policies, requiring insured to cooperate fully with insurer in
defending against daims which would create liability under the policy. Prosser,
Torts (1941) 908.
"Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 1o6, 22 N. E. (2d) 254, 128 A. L. R. 1oi5 (1989);
39 Am. Jur. 736.
"s3 9 Am. Jur. 736. Djo statute has been found which allows specific recovery
where the parent is protected by liability insurance, but in the Canadian Case of
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Marchand, 4 D. L. R. 157 (1923), a minor child was allowed
recovery from an insured parent. The basis of the recovery was the broad language
of a Canadian statute rendering every person capable of distinguishing right from
wrong responsible for damages caused by his fault.
'No right to a deficiency judgment existed in early Enblish mortgage law. A
mortgage was regarded as a full conveyance of title to the morgaged property subject to defeasance upon payment of the debt. If the debt was not paid when due,
title vested adsolutely in the mortgagee. Brabner-Smith, Economic Aspects of the
Deficiency Judgment (1934) 2o Va. L. Rev. 719.
2
At first the foreclosure was regarded as creating a complete bar to an action
on the debt, no matter how depreciated the value of the property. Though this
theory was abandoned at an early date, the mortgagee still had no satisfactory
means of reaching the remaining assets of his debtor. Equity courts refused to apply
the maxim that equity having obtained jurisdiction for one purpose will retain it
and administer full relief. The mortgagee had to turn back to his legal remedies
to enforce his debt and thereby bear the expenses and delays of bringing a separate
action. Further, the Chancery Courts took the position that such an action on the
debt operated to reopen the foreclosure proceedings and reinstate the mortgagor's
equity of redemption. Tefit, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure (1937) 4 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 575, 586.
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judgment, it is now an accepted principle that, under normal circumstances, the creditor is entitled to a judgment for the amount of the
3
debt not satisfied by the liquidation of the mortgage security. However, during the depression of the early thirties, when conditions were
not normal, this right enabled many mortgagees to obtain a windfall
and worked a corresponding hardship upon mortgagors. At a great
many of the foreclosure sales there was an acute lack of competitive
bidding. Consequently, the mortgagee was able to bid in the property
for a negligible amount, and saddle the mortgagor with a large deficiency judgment, often as great as the original debt after court costs
4
and fees were added.
State legislatures, realizing the seriousness of the economic crisis,
resorted to various means of alleviating the plight of mortgagors. 5
Some enacted legislation providing that deficiency suits be stayed for
a certain time; 6 other statutes allowed deficiency suits but provided
that the reasonable value of the property should be deducted from the
amount decreed to be due; 7 still others abolished the deficiency judgment entirely. 8
Many of these enactments were bitterly attacked, mainly on the
ground of impairment of the obligations of contracts, but very few were
ever declared unconstitutional. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell,9 probably stated most clearly the attitude of
the courts in construing the moratory statutes. He conceded that the
prohibition against impairing the obligations of contracts has no
reference to the degree of impairment. "The largest and least are alike
forbidden."'10 But the test of reasonableness, as to what is an impairment, may be changed by a crisis, such as an economic depression. Con3Walsh, Mortgages (1934) 317.

'Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments During an Economic Depression
(1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 771.
5

Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments During an Economic Depression
(1934) 2o Va. L. Rev. 771.
6Idaho Gen. Acts (1933) c. 182; 111. Laws (1933) p. 649; Mich. Pub Acts (1933) No.
98; Minn Laws (1933) c. 339; Mont. Laws (1933) c. 116; N. H. Laws (1933) c. 161;
Okla. Sess. Laws (1933) c. 16; Tex. Gen. Laws (1933) c. 102.
7idaho Sess. Laws (1933) c. 15o; Kan. Laws (1933) c. 218; N. J. Laws (1933)c.
82; N. Y. Laws (1933) c. 794; S. C. Acts (1933) No. 264.
'Ark. Acts (1933) No. 57; N. D. Laws (1933) c. 155. The citations in this note
and the preceeding two notes were obtained from Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency
Judgments During an Economic Depression (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 771, 772-775.
'290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. ed. 413, 88 A. L. R. 1481 (1934).
" 0Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 552, 18 L. ed. 403, 409 (U. S. 1867).
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sequently, a regulation which would be unreasonable and therefore an
impairment in normal times might be reasonable during an emergency
and thus not an impairment. In 1941, the Supreme Court in Gelfert v.
2
National City Bank of New York," held a New York moratory statute'
to be constitutional though it was applicable generally, rather than being limited to any declared public emergency. In holding that the Act
does not impair the obligations of contracts, the Court pointed to the
long history of the control of judicial sales of realty by courts of equity,
and ruled that the legislatures can substitute a uniform rule for the
more limited control of equity courts.'3 Thus, the judiciary has demonstrated an inclination to cooperate with the legislatures in providing
new forms of relief for the mortgage debtor in normal times as well as
during depression periods.
In Pennsylvania, moratory legislation similar to the New York Act
was adopted in 1934,14 193515 and 1937,16 but each law was declared

unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 17 After the
New York statute was upheld in the Gelfert case, the Pennsylvania legislature in 1941 passed another Act,' 8 correcting the special legislation objection to the 1937 Act but retaining the provisions of the 1934
Act, which had been held to be an impairment of the obligations of
contracts. The Pennsylvania court in Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Co.
v. Allen declared this statute constitutional "on the ground that it is
U. S. 221, 61 S. Ct. 898, 85 L. ed. 1299, 33 A. L. R. 1467 (1941).
"New York Civil Practice Ace § 1083 which provides that in determining the
amount of a deficiency judgment on the foreclosure of a mortgage, the court shall
fix the "fair and reasonable market value" of the property, and shall deduct from
the amount of the debt either such market value or the sales price of the property,
whichever is higher.
23... it is quite uniformly the rule in this country, as in England that while
equity will not set aside a sale for mere inadequacy of price, it will do so if the
inadequacy is so great as to shock the conscience or if there are additional circumstafices against its fairness, such as chilled bidding." Gelfert v. National City Bank
of New York, 313 U. S. 221, 232, 61 S. Ct. 898, 9o2, 85 L. ed. 1299, 1303, 133 A. L. R.
1467, 1470 0940.
121 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1948 Supp.) § 8o6.
521 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1948 Supp.) § § 808-820.
"21 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1948 Supp.) § § 821a-8211.
"The first two were held to impair obligations of contracts: Beaver County
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich; 323 Pa. 483, 187 Aft. 481 (1936); Knox v. Noggle,
328 Pa. 302, 196 Alt. 18 (1938); the latter was held to be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against special legislation: Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on
Lives and Granting Annuities v. Scott, 329 Pa. 534, 198 Ad. 115 (1938).
"Deficiency Judgment Act, July 16, 1941, P. L. 400, 12 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Pudron,
1948 Supp.) § 2621.1 et seq.
'2313
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desirable to preserve uniformity of construction
of the contract clauses
9
of both state and federal constitutions."'
There is, however, a vital difference between the New York Act
upheld in the Gelfert case and the 1941 Pennsylvania statute. The
former merely requires the mortgagee to credit the mortgage debtor
with the fair market value of the property foreclosed if the confirmation of the foreclosure sale occurred after the passage of the Act. Personal judgments received following sales confirmed before the Act,
which remained unsatisfied, were not disturbed. On the other hand,
the Pennsylvania statute provides for the reduction of personal judgments which were binding before the effective date of the law. Granted
that uniformity of construction of constitutions is desirable, though
"nothing requires the state courts to adopt the rule which the federal or other courts may believe to be the better one," 20 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, apparently having taken cognizance of this
difference in the New York and Pennsylvania laws, 21 should have applied this rule of uniformity only to the extent that the two are similar. The court declined to follow this policy as early as 1942, in Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v.
Scott.22 The Gelfert case 23 Ivas again relied on as authority for holding
the Pennsylvania statute constitutional when, by its own provision, it
was applied retroactively to a foreclosure sale and deficiency judgment
which antedated the effective date of the Act. That this decision is
clearly fraught with serious implications is demonstrated by the decision rendered in the recent Pennsylvania case of Dearnley v. Survetnick,24 which is based squarely upon the Scott case as authority.
In the Dearnley case, the plaintiff, assignee of a mortgage given as
security for a $5,ooo bond, instituted foreclosure proceedings in 1933
and received a deficiency judgment for $4,95 o , having bought in the

property for $5o at the sheriff's sale. He received this judgment five
"343 Pa. 428, 22 A. (2d) 896 (1941).
2°Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank, 3o6 U. S. 103, 109, 59 S. Ct. 420,
423, 83 L. ed. 515, 519 (1939).
"In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Allen, 343 Pa. 428, 22 A. (2d) 896 (1941)
the court in a per curium decision states: "As the record does not involve the application of the Act to sales on judgments in personam made prior to its effective
date, no opinion on the subject is expressed." However, from the cases cited therein, the inference arises that if the case arose it would hold a retroactive extension
unconstitutional.
"2346 Pa. 13, 29 A. (2d) 328, 144 A. L. R. 849 (1942).
2313 U. S. 221, 61 S. Ct. 898, 85 L. ed. 1299, 133 A. L. R.. 1467 (1941).
2'36o Pa. 572, 63 A. (2d) 66 (1949).

CASE COMMENTS

IL9491

years later and received judgment and assessed damages for over
$7,000, including interest accruing from 1933. In 1941, after the
Deficiency Judgment Act 25 was passed, on petition by plaintiff, the
court fixed the "fair market value" of the property at $4,500, which
amount was deducted from the plaintiff's judgment. Plaintiff apparently accepted this ruling of the court, for in 1948 he again revived the
debt and received judgment and assessed damages for the reduced
amount plus interest from 1941. Defendant, then, on petition, obtained a rule to have the judgment opened on the ground that damages
were excessive in that plaintiff received interest on the $4,500 from 1933
to 1941. Plaintiff appealed from this order. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was virtually forced by its previous decisions to affirm
the order, for once the ruling of the Scott case was accepted, that the
"fair market value" statute could be applied retroactively, then it
logically followed that interest could only be allowed on the reduced
amount. However, the fallacy of this logic lies in the major premise
upon which the decision rests-i.e., that the retroactive application of
the statute is constitutional.
It is a basic principle of law that a legislature cannot, under the
guise of changing a remedy, destroy or impair final judgments obtained before the passage of the act.26 The two reasons most frequently
cited for this limitation on legislative power are, that the judgment
is property of the judgment creditor of which he can not be deprived
without due process of law,2 7 and that under our system of division of
governmental powers, the legislature cannot invade the province of
the judiciary to upset judgments which have become binding.28 While
it is generally true that there is no vested right in any particular
remedy,29 and thus remedies may be altered without depriving one
of his constitutional rights, yet a remedy may be so vital to the obligation that any alteration of it materially affects that obligation.8 0 It seems
clear that the plaintiffs remedy here, which was changed by the "fair
2' 1

2

Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1948 Supp.) § 2621.1 et seq. The act provides that

if the sale occurred prior to the effective date of the act and part of the debt remains unsatisfied, then the mortgagee is to petition the court to fix the fair 'market
value of the property, which amount shall be deducted from any deficiency judg-

ment if this value is greater than the sales price.
2'Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 6oo, 43 S. Ct. 435, 67 L. ed. 8sg (1923).
21
See McCabe v. Emerson, 18 Pa. 111, 112 (1851).
2'See Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446, 448, 82 Am. Dec. 526, 528 (1862).
"'Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S.437, 23 S. Ct. 234, 47 L. ed.
249 (k903)OVon Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 18 L.. ed. 4o3 (U. S.. 1867).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

market value" statute, was of the very essence of the mortgage creditor's right to recover payment of the debt.
It is argued in the Scott case3 ' that no property right of the plaintiff is destroyed because all that he is entitled to is payment in full for
his debt, and, assuming that he will eventually realize the "fair market
value" of the property, he will ultimately be paid in full. But in actual
practice the reduction of a $7,000 judgment, which became binding
eight years prior to the passage of the statute, to one of less than $1,ooo,
is very likely to result in an impairment of a vested right. To illustrate, suppose that the plaintiff in the Dearnley case, soon after purchasing the property for $5o had sold it for $1oo. Since it appears that
the principles which the court laid down in the Dearnley case would
apply to such facts, the mortgagee's deficiency judgment would have
been reduced By $4,500, while he would have suffered a 44,400 loss,
merely because he could not anticipate the passage of a statute eight
years later which would require him to reduce his judgment by the
"fair market value" of the property. The court's assumption that the
plaintiff will eventually realize $4,500 from the land is of little solace
to others who may have sold during a depression, when the so-called
"fair market value" is purely fictional and the "true market value" is
a mere fraction of that hypothetical figure.
The essential vice of the Dearnley decision lies more directly in
economic considerations than in legal concepts,3 2 because the term
"fair market value" cannot be fairly applied retroactively. It has no
reference to any particular time; fair price in 1941 would likely have
been an exorbitant price in 1933, when the land was sold. Thus, to
cope with the burden laid on him by the Pennsylvania court, the
mortgagee either must eschew the role of bidder at his own foreclosure
sale (thereby often leaving no bidders at all), or must, after bidding
in the property, retain it until its actual market value rises to a point
equal to what some unknown court at some unknown later date may,
by the application of some unknown formula, determines was the "fair
market value" at the time of the foreclosure sale. Admitting that the
fixing of a "fair market value" is desirable for the protection of the
mortgage debtor, this protection would be preserved even if the un81346 Pa. 15, 29 A (2d) 328, 330, 144 A. L. R. 849, 852 (1942).
"The holding that the statute can be applied retroactively becomes less important with the passage of time, as the number of persons holding deficiency judgments dating from before July iG, i94i, when the statute was passed, decreases.
However, to allow such a decision to remain the law gives an unsound precedent
upon which to base subsequent decisions and legislation.
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desirable retroactive provision were to be held unconstitutional, since
the statute contains a separability clause. 3
WILIAM S. HUBARD

PROCEDURE-AvAILABILITY

OF WRIT OF HABEAS CoRPus To ATTACK

VALIDITY OF ORDER MADE BY COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION.

[Fed-

eral]
In a series of cases decided more than half a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States apparently embraced the doctrine
"that a judgment showing on its face lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter [is] void for all purposes."' As. a result, when such judgments
involved the improper incarceration of an individual, they were held
2
subject to collateral attack through the writ of habeas corpus. More
recent decisions have, however, considerably modified this earlier principle, and it is now said that where the fact of jurisdiction has been

adjudicated, the judgment cannot be collaterally attacked.3 Thus,
in 1931, in the Baldwin case, 4 it was decided that jurisdiction of the
person was res judicata. Seven years later, determination of jurisdic5
tion over the subject matter was held to be res judicata, and this principle was soon extended to any matter which might have been litigated
m1 2 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1948 Supp.) § 2621.11. "The provision of this act
shall be severable, and if any section, provision or clause thereof be held to be unconstitutional, the decision so holding shall not be construed to affect or impair
any other section, provision or clause of this act."
2Judge Clark, concurring, in United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F.
(2d) 94, 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
2
Ex Parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604, 26 L. ed. 861 (1881); Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U. S.
713, .5S. Ct. 724, 28 L. ed. 1117 (1885); Ex Parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 S. Ct. 164,
31 L. ed. 216 (1887); In re Sawyer, 124 U. S.2oo, 8 S.Ct. 482, 31 L. ed. 402 (1888).
3Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 65, 175, 59 S.Ct. 134, 139, 83 L. ed. 104, 110 (1938):
"'Even if that court erred in entertaining jurisdiction, its determination of that
matter was conclusive upon the parties before it, and could not be questioned by
them, or either of them, collaterally, or otherwise than on writ of error or appeal to
this court.'
'Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S.522, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.
ed. 1244 (1931). Where the defendant appeared before the court to determine the

court's jurisdiction over him and did not appeal from an adverse judgment, he is
barred by res judicata from questioning the jurisdiction in a later suit on the
judgment.
"Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 59 S. Ct. 134, 83 L. ed. 104 (1938). An adjudica-

tion of a federal court in a bankruptcy proceeding was held to be res judicata in
a suit in a state court brought by a bond hplder, who had been notified of the
federal proceedings, but did not appear.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

in the prior suit.6 Having had his day in court and having failed to
exercise his right to appeal from the erroneous finding of jurisdiction,
the aggrieved party is estopped to dispute the validity of the decision
in another type of proceeding 7 However, while this estoppel operates
generally to sustain improper but unappealed court orders, the right
to collateral attack by habeas corpus is still recognized in what are indefinitely termed "exceptional cases." 8
The confusion which still surrounds this issue is graphically demonstrated in the recent case of United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy.9
The controversy grew out of an action for partnership accounting
brought in the United States District Court for the Territory of
Hawaii, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the court finding
that both Menashe, the plaintiff, and Sutton, the defendant, were residents of New York. A suit in equity was then brought in the territorial
court of Hawaii, and upon consent of the parties a receiver was appointed. Thereafter, Menashe brought a suit in the federal district
court in New York for the appointment of an ancillary receiver. A
temporary appointment was later made permanent, after the court
had overruled the defendant Sutton's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. 0 From these appointments of receivers the defendant
did not appeal. An order was entered appointing a master and directing Sutton to give testimony in regard to the location of partnership
assets. Sutton's attempt to appeal from this order was dismissed because
such an order was held to be not appealable. Subsequently, he refused
to answer the questions of the master, and was adjudged guilty of
contempt and directed to pay a $22,000 fine to the ancillary receiver,
with opportunity to purge himself of contempt by 'testifying fully.
When he still refused, on advice of counsel, to answer any question, a
commitment order was entered fining him $22,ooo and costs, to be
6

Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 3o8 U. S.371, 60 S. Ct.

317, 84 L. ed. 329 (1940). A reorganization under a statute that was later declared

unconstitutional required bond-holders to cash their bonds within a year or have
them declared cancelled. The plaintiff did not cash his bonds, but after the statute
was declared unconstitutional he brought a suit to recover on them. The Supreme
Court held that he could not attack the reorganization collaterally, but that he
should have attacked directly by appeal.
7Note (1948) 9 Ohio St. L. J. 539.
8Bowen v. Johntson, 3o6 U. S. 19, 27, 59 S.Ct. 442, 446, 83 L. ed. 455, 461 (1939):
"But it is equally true that the rule is not so inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of
hebaes corpus is apparent."
9169 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948), noted (1948). 9.Ohio St. L. J. 539.
1

°Menashe v. Sutton, 71 F. Supp. 1O3 (S.D. N. Y. 1947).
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paid to the marshal. Sutton then sued out the writ of habeas corpus on
the ground that the court making the contempt order was without
jurisdiction. The writ was discharged in the district court, and that
judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in a two to one decision. Though the entire court assumed,
almost without discussion, that the district court which made the contempt order had no jurisdiction of the ancillary receivership suit,"
each of the three judges found it necessary to write a separate opinion
on the question of whether the validity of the lower court's action
could be tested in habeas corpus proceedings.
Judge Swan, writing the opinion for the appellate court, reasoned
that, the orders appointing the receivers being appealable, even though
petitioner Sutton failed to appeal from them, the question of jurisdiction was to be regarded as litigated and so immune from collateral attack. Though Judge Clark, concurring, had some misgivings because
of his "law-school teachings ... that a judgment showing on its face
12
lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter was void for all purposes,"'
he nevertheless "guessed" that Judge Swan was correct on the current
state of the law, inasmuch as Sutton "did have plenty of opportunity to
continue upon appeal the issue he had already raised below .... ,13
Both opinions appear to turn ultimateljr on the conclusion that the defendant had had the "day in court" to which he was entitled.' 4 This
"There are at least two possible grounds which may have been regarded as
sufficient by the lower court to support its jurisdiction. One is diversity of citizenship under the 194o amendment to 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(1) between a citizen of a
state and a citizen of a territory. But the United States District Court for the Terditory of Hawaii had already found that the defendants "'though alleged to be residents of the Territory of Hawaii are in fact residents of the State of New York.' "
Menashe v. Sutton, 71 F. Supp. io3 (S. D. N. Y. 1947). The other possible basis for
jurisdiction was that the action for partnership accounting in the territorial court
of Hawaii would give the Federal District Court jurisdiction to appoint an ancillary
receiver. But that contention was rejected by both Judges Clark and Frank, 169 F.
(ad) 94, at 96, and 97, n. i.
"'169 F. (2d) 94, 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948). Here Judge Clark refered to cases discussed by Justice Rutledge, dissenting, in United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 33o U. S. 258, $51-363, 67 S. Ct. 677, 724-730, 91 L. ed. 884, 943-949 (1947)
some of which are found in note 2, supra.
u169 F. (2d) 94, 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
lhThe only case cited in the court's opinion on the issue of collateral attack by
habeas corpus was an earlier case decided by the same court, United States ex rel.
Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). There the relator was the
president and sole stockholder of a corporation which filed a petition in the bankruptcy court for reorganization. An agreement was made with one Raskin wherein
Raskin was to provide $2,500 to pay 3o% to the creditors in cash. The relator varied
from the agreement, and later Raskin applied for a resettlement, which led to the
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view seems to be sustained by the cases following the Baldwin case
which held that where the issue of jurisdiction has been, or could have
been litigated, the issue is immune from collateral attack. 15
Judge Frank, dissenting, 16 seemed to concede that the res judicata
theory may be valid generally to prevent collateral attacks on judgments, but he argued strenuously that it is not applicable in this case.
His view was that, if it is correct to assume that the contempt and
commitment orders which petitioner seeks to avoid were not appealable, he did not have a chance to attack the jurisdiction of the court
directly at that stage of the proceedings. While it was true that the
original orders appointing the receivers were appealable, Judge Frank
reasoned that Sutton's failure to appeal from them should not be held
to forfeit all rights to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction. Since
these orders did not affect him in a practical way, he "felt no bite"' 7 in
the court's action at that point, and so had no reason to think it necessary to incur the expense of an appeal. The "bite" was felt only in the
form of the order to testify before the receiver, which led to the contempt and commitment orders. These orders being non-appealable, the
only means by which Sutton could raise the issue of their invalidity because of the court's lack of jurisdiction was through some collateral
proceedings.
debtor-corporation being directed to pay Raskin $3,042.5o. Raskin, after failure to
collect, moved to include the relator individually as well as the corporation, which
motion was granted with an order to deliver the property of the debtor to Raskin.
For failure to observe the order, both the debtor and relator were held in contempt and fined $3,042.5o, relator being allowed to purge himself by payment of
$40 per month. This he failed to do, and the bankruptcy court ordered him committed to the custody of the marshal. Between the contempt order and the commitment order, relator's motions for modification were denied. No appeal was taken
from any of these orders of the bankruptcy court, but after commitment, relator
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court, finding that the bankruptcy court had passed on its own jurisdiction, came to the conclusion that the
bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction over the part of the order on which the
commitment was based. "Yet he had opportunity to and did raise that issue in the
prior proceeding, and the court found against him. Even if we assume that the
court was acting upon erroneous grounds as indicated above, yet Stoll v. Gottlieb ...
makes it clear that the matter is settled against collateral attack." 17 F. (2d) 483,
487. The writ was discharged.
In his dissent in the Sutton case, Judge Frank distinguished the Sutton case by
saying, "Nor is it a case of commitment for violation of an injunction order, or of an
order to turn over funds wrongfully withheld, when the violated order (a) might
have been appealed but was not, as in United States v. Jaeger...." 169 F. (ad) 94,
99 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
1
See text at notes 3, 4, 5,and 6, supra.
'1869 F. (2d) 94, 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
2%69 F. (2d) 94, 99 (C. C. A. ad, 1948).
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This basis for sustaining the writ of habeas corpus may well be
questioned for the reason that the exercise of ordinary foresight should
have warned Sutton that the "bite" was menacingly in prospect before
it was actually felt. One of the practical results to be expected from the
appointment of court officers to locate the partnership assets was obviously that Sutton would be required to give testimony on the subject under investigation. But even so, after Sutton had, with some reason and on advice of counsel, foregone the opportunity to appeal, his
predicament became such that there were good grounds for making
this an "exceptional case" in which habeas corpus should lie.
The Supreme Court in Sunal v. Large has given recent recognition
to the fact that in exceptional situations "habeas corpus has done service for an appeal

....

"

"That is to say, the writ has at times been

entertained either without consideration of the adequacy of relief by
the appellate route or where an appeal would have afforded an adequate remedy. Illustrative are those instances where ... there was a con-

viction by a federal court whose jurisdiction over the person or the
offense was challenged .... 10 But it was also observed that "where
the jurisdiction of the federal court which tried the case is challenged
... habeas corpus is increasingly denied in case'20an appellate procedure
was available for the correction of the error."
Judge Swan, having emphasized the failure of petitioner to appeal
from the district court's appointment of the receiver, pointed to this
latter statement of the Supreme Court as indicating that the principal
case situation was not within the "exceptional" classification.21 However, though the writ was discharged in the Sunal case, that decision is
not authority for the principal decision, for the cases are clearly distinguishable.2 2 There the Court held that habeas corpus could not be
1332 U. S. 174, 179, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1591, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1987 (1947).
"532 U. S. 174, 178, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1591, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1987 (1947).
32 U. S. 174, 179, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1i51, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1987 (1947).
2169 F. (2d) 94, 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
2Sunal, a Jehovah's Witness, claimed exemption granted by Congress to regular ordained ministers of religion, § 5 (d), under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. The local board denied the exemptions and classified Sunal as
s-A. He reported to the board, after exhausting his administrative remedies trying
unsuccessfully to effect a change in classification, but refused to submit to induction.
He was then convicted under § ii of the Act for refusing to submit to induction, and
sentenced on March 22, 1945. Evidence at the trial that his classification was invalid was held inadmissible. He did not appeal from the conviction because the
chances of securing a reversal seemed slight. However, on February 4, 1946, the
Court decided Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. ed. 567,
(1946) which, on similar facts, held such exclusion of testimony to be reversible er-
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used as a substitute for a remedy which was at all times dearly present
but was not availed of because considered to be futile. It was specifically noted in the opinion that the "error did not go to the jurisdiction
of the.trial court," 23 as it admittedly did in the principal case. From the
standpoint from which Judge Frank viewed petitioner Sutton's situation, there is the additional distinguishing factor that the contempt
orders which were being attacked were not appealable in nature.
Three Justices of the Supreme Court thought that even in the circumstances of the Sunal case, the writ should be granted because such
24
action was "'necessary to prevent a complete miscarriage of justice'."
It is the opinion of Justice Rutledge that, "by the sum of the [Supreme
Court] decisions,"2 5 such is the ultimate test of the availability of
habeas corpus, for it is essential ".

. that the great writ of habeas

corpus should not be confined by rigidities characterizing ordinary
26
jurisdictional doctrines."
Though Judge Frank nowhere employs the term "exceptional case,"
the tenor of his opinion is clearly that the principal case should be
treated as such. The facts that the commitment orders were regarded
as unappealable, that Sutton had not felt the need of appealing from
the receivership appointments, that he had at all times acted reasonably on advice of competent counsel, that he had merely chosen "the
wrong ladder from the district court" 27 to the appellate court, and
that the ultimate alternatives of paying a large fine or going to jail
were very severe, all combine to build up a strong argument for relief.
The flexibility of the application of the habeas corpus writ is
further emphasized by the dissent's suggestion of a third alternative
approach through which the court could justifiably hear Sutton's case.
Though it had been assumed that the commitment orders were not
appealable, this point, too, is not without uncertainty.28 Therefore,
ror. Sunal, shortly afterwards, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to test the
validity of his conviction.
233 2 U. S. 174, 181, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1592, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1989 (1947).
28332 U. S. 174, 188, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1596, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1992 (1947), quoting
from United State ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F. (2d) 811, 813 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
Justices Frankfurter, Rutledge and Murphy were the dissenters.
2332 U. S. 174, 188, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1596, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1992 (1947).
28332 U. S. 174, 187, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1595, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1992 (1947).
'169 F. (2d) 94, 101 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
2169
F. (2d) 94, 1oo (C. C. A. 2d, 1948). Judge Frank cites/Hickman v. Taylor,
153 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1945) as authority for allowing appeal in a similar
commitment order, which the Supreme Court affirmed after granting certiorari. But
he also points out that it is not easy to reconcile that conclusion with other Supreme
Court decisions, such as Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S.255, 44 S. Ct. io3, 68 L. ed. 293
(1923), where it was held that appeal would lie from criminal contempt, but that
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Judge Swan urged that, if the orders are to be regarded as appealable,
then, since Sutton had appealed from the discharge of his writ of
habeas corpus before the time for appeal from the commitment orders
was expired, "it cannot be said that he tried to use habeas corpus as
a substitute for an appeal which, because of lapse of time, was no
longer open to him." 29 In order to free itself from "antiquated procedural technicalism [and] the exaltation of labels," 30 the court should
treat the appeal from the dismissal of habeas corpus as if it had been
an appeal from the commitment order.
Each of the judges in the principal case would seem to concede
that the rules governing the use of habeas corpus are in such a state of
uncertainty that rights under that writ are extremely precarious. The
Sutton decision has surely done nothing to resolve this uncertainty;
and a reading of the opinions gives the impression that the judges felt
that, in view of the several controversial points involved, the Supreme
Court would be called upon to give the final word on the case. It is to
be hoped that in this event, the Court will attempt to give a definitive
answer to the issue of the availability of habeas corpus writs for making
collateral attacks on actions taken by courts without jurisdiction.
RAY S. SirmH, JR.

TORTS-LIABILITY OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE FOR LIBEL CONTAINED IN WILL

AND PUBLISHED ONLY BY PROBATE OF WILL. [South Carolina]

Because of the restrictive effect of the rule that a cause of action for
a personal tort abates at the death of the tortfeasor, one who is libeled
by defamatory language contained in a probated will is faced with a
strong possibility of being left without legal means of recovering compensation for the injury done to him. The cases agree that the executor
a civil contempt order was interldcutory and non-appealable. Also, Doyle v. London
Guarantee &Accident Co., 204 U. S. 599, 27 S. Ct. 313, 51 L. ed. 641 (19o7). Judge
Frank said the ruling in the Doyle case seemed to have been modified in Union
Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 42 S. Ct. 427, 66 L. ed. 848 (1922). There the Supreme Court found that, in an order partly remedial and partly punitive, the criminal features dominate, and since an order punishing criminally is a final judgment, the order was appealable. Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U. S. 105, 57 S. Ct. 57, 81
L. ed. 67 (1936), held that no appeal was available from an order fining or imprisoning for civil contempt except in connection with an appeal from a final judgment
or decree.
2169 F. (2d) 94, 101 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
Wi69 F. (2d) 94, 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1948).
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who caused the will to be probated is not personally liable.' Because
he is bound to offer the will to a court of probate, his act is absolutely
privileged. The problem, therefore, is whether the estate of the testator
should respond in damages to the injured party.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently considered this
unique question in Carver v. Morrow.2 A codicil to a will which had
been duly proved and probated after the death of defendant's testatrix
contained matter which plaintiff alleged to be libelous. The action was
brought against the defendants as executor, on the theory that the
probate of the will constituted a publication of the libel. The court
sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint. Inasmuch as the
libelous matter in the will was not published in testatrix's lifetime,
the common law rule that a personal action ex delicto dies with the
person was thought to be sufficient to defeat recovery. In the court's
opinion, the executor was not the testatrix's agent for purposes of consummating the tort, but was an agency of the law to probate the will.
The few cases decided on this point show a diversity of opinion.3
The Carver case 4 cited and followed the reasoning employed by the
Georgia Supreme Court in Citizens and Southern National Bank v.
Hendricks,5 decided in 1933 and regarded as a "leading case" in the
field. Those courts taking the opposite view, holding the estate of the
testator liable for damages to the injured party, reason that the common law maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" does not apply, in that the cause of action did not accrue in the lifetime of the
testator. As pointed out by the Tennessee court in Harrisv. Nashville
1

Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 910 (1945); Nagle v. Nagle, 316
1027; "...When a nominated executor in a libelous last will does accept office and publishes the will to the
extent of presenting it for probate ... the petitioning executor should be ... absolutely privileged and protected from personal liability...." Matter of Payne, 16o
Misc. 224, 230, 29o N. Y. Supp. 407 (1936). For other authority see note 3, infra.
2213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. (2d) 814 (1948).
'The estate has been held liable in Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S.
(2d) 91o (1945); In re Gallagher's Estate, so Pa. Dist. 733 (sgos); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1914). The estate was held not liable in
Citizens &Southern National Bk. v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933).
'213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. (2d) 814, 816 (1948).
"If a paper executed as a will expresses libelous matter, and the act of the
executor in propounding the will is relied on to complete the offense and afford
ground for recovery against the estate, such reliance must fail, because the testator
has died. If it be said that the act of the executor in propounding the well could be
taken into account, the reply is that the executor was a creature or agency of the law
to administer the estate, and was not the testator's representative in the continuation
or consummation of the testator's wrong." 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313, 315 (1933).

Pa. 507, 175 Atl. 487 (1934); Note (935) 48 Harv. L. Rev.
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Trust Co., "To say that an action dies with the person... implies that
the cause of action existed in the lifetime of the person; that it was existing while the person lived and abated with his death." 6 The executor
is considered the agent of the testator to probate the will, and the agent
having published the libel in pursuance of the authority given, the
estate-principal is held liable.
Regardless of which result the decisions reach, much attention is
given in the opinions to the question of whether the executor can be
held to have acted in an agency capacity in publishing the libel by
probating the will. It is, of course, a basic principle that publication is
an essential element of libel, and until such publication no action for
damages will lie.7 Generally the defamatory matter must be published
by the defendant, but if a person writes a libelous statement, leaving
it in such form that it will necessarily be published by others, he is
liable if such results were intended.8
In spite of this accepted premise that publication can be made by
another than the party alleged to have committed the libel, it seems
necessary to concede that for the purposes of the instant case, liability
based on a true agency relationship between the testator and executor
cannot be supported upon orthodox doctrines. Although the principal
is responsible for publication of a libel through an agent, 9 this is
true only where the principal is alive at the time of publication; and,
in general, where not coupled with an interest, the authority of the
agent is terminated upon the death of the principal. 10 To say that the
0128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584, 586 (914).
7
McDaniel v. Crescent Motors, 249 Ala. 33o, 31 S. (2d) 343, 172 A. L. R. 204
(1947); McFarlan v. Manget, 179 Ga. 17, 174 S. E. 712 (1934); Satterfield v. McLellan
Stores, 215 N. C. 582, 2 S.E. (2d) 709 (1939); Fingerhut v. Weiner, 147 Misc. 269,
263 N. Y. Supp. 636 (1933); "The basis of the action is damages for injury to the
character in the opinion of others. This cannot arise but from publication." Harper,
Torts (1933) 5oo. See Prosser, Torts (1941) 81o.
'Sourbier v. Brown, 188 Ind. 554, 123 N. E. 802 (1919); James v. Powell, 154 Va.
96, 152 S.E. 539 (1930); "It is not necessary that the publication of a libel should
be effected solely or directly by the author of it personally. For if a person having
a printed or written defamatory statement parts with it in order that its contents may
become known ... fit)
will amount to a publication...." Newell, Slander and Libel
o
( 4 th ed. 1924) 2oo. Also see Harper, Torts (1933) 5 .
'Bacon v. Michigan Central R. Co., 55 Mich. 224, 21 N. W. 324, 54 Am. Rep. 372
(1884); Mann v. Life & Casualty Ins., Co., 132 S. C. 193, 129 S.E. 79 (1925); "It is
well settled that a principal is responsible where authority is given to an agent to
publish libelous words and a publication is made by the agent in substantial accord with his authority." Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W.
584, 585 (1914). For a complete discussion of this question, see Note (1944) 150
A. L. R. 1338.
"Streit v. Wilkerson, 186 Ala. 88, 65 So. 164 (1914); Ferguson v. Pilling, 231
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executor is the agent of the testator for purposes of consummating the
tort "would be an extraordinary extension of the law governing the
relationship of principal and agent."'"
The issue of publication by agency, however, seems actually to be
secondary in significance to the effect the courts see fit to give the maxim
that actions ex delicto die with the person. Under the traditional rules
concerning defamation cases, in the absence of an enabling statute the
cause of action dies with the defamer. 12 But as the Harris case' 3 indicated, the present situation differs from the normal libel case in that
the cause of action did not arise until after the defamer's death.' 4 As
there is no tort action until after the death of the testator, the way is
open for courts to rule that cases employing the general rule in normal
defamation situations are not precedents on the exact issue involved in
this type of case. The courts are thus free to decide the question either
way on grounds of policy and fundamental justice.
Those courts refusing to hold the estate of a deceased person liable
for an act consummated after his death fear that they would be setting
a precedent for other types of actions against a decedent's estate, such as
may arise "if a man digs a pit for his enemy and dies, and later the
enemy falls into the pit and is injured... [or one] hires another to assault his enemy and dies and later the assault is committed as he orIowa 530, 1 N. W. (2d) 662; "The reason for this rule is that the authorized acts
of the agent are in their nature the acts of the principal, and by legal fiction the
agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an execution of the principal's continuing will." Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. (2d) 814, 817 (1948); Restatement, Agency (1933) § 120.
3Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E. (2d) 814, 816 (1948).
1'This is true under the common law rules even though suit has been instituted
against the defamer before his death. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294,
162 P. (2d) 133 (1945); Blodgett b. Greenfield, 1oi Cal. App. 399, 281 Pac. 694 (1929);
Note (19o7) 6 Ann. Cas. 513; Legis. (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. ioo8; 1 R. C. L. 48;
1 C. J. S. 200.
3Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1914).
:4Publication is an essential element of libel, and this was accomplished by probate of the will. Though it may be argued the libel was published during decedent's
lifetime by the dictation of the will to a stenographer, still this is not the publication
complained of. Citizens & Southern National Bk. v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168
S. E. 313 (1933); Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 91o (1945); In re
Gallagher's Estate, lo Pa. Dist. 733 (goi); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn.
573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914). Further, every repetition of the defamation is a republication giving rise to a new cause of action. Taylor v. Hungerford, 2o5 Iowa 1146,
217 N. W. 83 (1927); Sharpe v. Larson, 70 Minn. 209, 72 N. W. 961 (1897); Sawyer
v. Gilmer, Inc., 189 N. C. 7, 126 S. E. 183, 41 A. L. R. 1184 (1925); 53 C. J. S.137;
Prosser, Torts (1941) 812.
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dered."'15 However, unless one is a stern convert to the belief that the
common law is perfect and changeless, it may be answered that recovery
should be allowed against the estate under these related circumstances,
inasmuch as a deliberate wrong was done and an actual injury was suffered. 16 But another answer is available, in that these supposedly comparable situations differ in one important respect from the libel case.
The defamer knows there will be no tort until after his death, whereas
in the illustrative cases the wrongdoer does not know that he will die
before a recovery can be had. In adhering rigidly to the rule that the
death of the libeling testator defeats the cause of action, the courts are
encouraging a voluntary, intentional wrongdoer as he selects a means of
almost certain publication, secure in the knowledge that the defamed
7
party will have no recovery.'
While the contrary view imports into the law the principle that a
decedent's estate is liable for a tort having no existence in his lifetime, the benefits to be gained by the allowance of the testamentary
libel action are worth the risk of the adoption of such a rule. "It is better that the residuary legatee should be to some extent cut short than
that the person wronged should be deprived of redress."' 8 Weight is
added to this contention by the fact that circumstances have made it
impossible for the libeled person even to attempt to reduce the damages by securing a retraction or an apology from his defamer.
The common law maxim, "actio personalis moritur cum persona,"
has long been discredited by the courts and many writers, 19 and legislatures have shown their disfavor by rejecting the maxim in compar21
Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. (2d) 814, 817 (1948), quoted by the
South Carolina court from Note (1933) 87 A. L. R. 234.
21"Since the medieval notion that tort actions are punitive has long been
abandoned, the wrongdoer's death should not end liability, and his distributees
should be made to satisfy claims against him. And since, conversely, compensation
is the purpose of modem tort recovery, it should accrue not only to a living person
but also to his estate on this analysis, the coincidence of the deaths of both parties
is immaterial." Legis. (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1oo1, 1012. As to legislative reaction
to the maxim, see note 19, infra.
27 "No more effective means of publishing and perpetuating a libel can be conceived than to secure the inscrption of such matter on court records, as by probate
of a will." Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, 585 (1914).
IsPollock, The Law of Torts (1lth ed. 1936) 62.
'"Hooper v. Gorham, 45 Maine 209 (1858); "The maxim... is by no means a
favorite with the courts. It has no champion at the date, nor has any judge or law
writer risen to defend it for 200 years past." Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn.

573, 162 S. W. 584, 586 (1914); Legis. (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. lOO; Note (1945) 32
Va. L. Rev. 189; Harper, Torts (1933) 501; Prosser, Torts (1941) 814; Tiffany, Death

by Wrongful Act (1893) § 14.
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able instances. 2 0 It seems that the courts in denying the right to maintain a libel action against the decedent's estate are giving little recognition to these statutes as starting points for judicial law-making. A new
statute is to be viewed "as an exemplification of a general principle
which is to take its place beside other precepts-whether founded in
codes or accepted expositions of the jurist-as an integral part of the
system, there to be extended to analogous situations not within the
21
precise terms."
If the maxim, though criticized on principle and infringed upon by
legislatures, is still regarded as too formidable to be overthrown or
evaded in cases of defamation by will, a feasible means appears in most
instances whereby the courts can at least avoid the infliction of the injury for which the law would be powerless to atone. Several courts have
agreed that upon the request of the executor, the probate court may
strike the libelous passages from the will and admit only its dispositive
features to probate. 22 Whenever the defamation is apparent to the
executor, he should be willing to take this step to protect the defamed
party by the prevention of the publication of the libel, since the testator's intent as to the distribution of his estate can still be effectively
carried out.238 However, no duty should be placed upon the executor to
petition the court to delete the defamatory passages from the will,24 be-

cause that would place a burden upon him of determining many close
questions of fact as to whether an actionable libel is contained in the
will.
2OFor a complete study of survival legislation classified according to each interest invaded, see Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort
Claims for and against Executors and Administrators (1931) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 969.
By statute, actions for libel survive the death of the defendant in eight jurisdictions.
Conn. Gen. Stat. (ig3o) § 6030; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1933) § 2-402; Iowa Code
(1946) § 611.2o; La. Civ. Code Ann. (1930) § 1712; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Choate,
1921) § 9086; N. H. Pub. Laws (1942) c. 355, § 15; N. Y. Dec. Est. Laws (1935) § i18.
2The Future of the Common law (1937): Stone, The Common Law in the
United States 120, 131.
'That the probate court possesses such power seems now to be settled in New
York: Matter of Bomar, 18 N. Y. Supp. 214 (1892); Matter of Speider, 128 Misc. 899,
221 N. Y. Supp. 223 (1926); Matter of Payne, 16o Misc. 224, 290 N. Y. Supp. 407
(1936); Matter of Draske, 16o Misc. 587, 290 N. Y. Supp. 581 (1936); and in England:
Marsh v. Marsh, i Swa. & Tr. 528, 6 Jur. (n.s.) 380 (186o); In Goods of White, 137

L. T. 65 (i9i4).

'In thus deleting the defamatory matter from the will the publication by probate is prevented. Matter of Draske, 16o Misc. 587, 29o N. Y. Supp. 581 (1936). The
court endorsed the view holding the estate liable and said: "The prevention of such
a diversion of assets to the defamed person is, therefore, in furtherance both of the
basic testamentary intent and of the advantage of of the beneficiaries named in
the will." 16o Misc. 587, 595.
24Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 91o (1945).
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In instances in which, the executor failing to have the objectionable
passages deleted, the libel is published by the probate of the will, the
courts, instead of adopting the passive attitude of the principal case,
would do better to follow the example of the Tennessee court in taking full advantage of the opportunities available for avoiding the
application of the maxim that the testator's death bars recovery.
I. La.i

WORNOM, JR.

FOR INJURIES ARISING FROM EMOTIONAL
BANCES IN ABSENCE OF INDEPENDENT TORT. [Ohio]

TORTs-LIABILITY

DISTUR-

The common law antipathy toward recognition of emotional disturbance as legal damage, exemplified in such statements as "mere
words do not constitute an assault," has, for the past half century, been
indirectly under attack, particularly by textwriters.1 Nevertheless, the
principle of non-liability in such cases has not been abandoned by the
courts, though great inroads have been made on the scope of its application. 2 It is apparent that the courts are reluctant to enter the field of
etiquette, and engage in an attempt to regulate the manners of people.
The immediate injury from a "verbal assault" is mental suffering, and
the courts have refused to recognize such injury alone as the basis of a
cause of action, reasoning that the door would thereby be opened to a
flood of fraudulent litigation and that the damages sought would be
3
too speculative and difficult of proof.

'Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6) 475: "Granting that legal principle expands as new conditions arise which educate the human mind to higher and
subtler conceptions of injury, there appears to be no theoretical reason why this
new form of damage [mental distress) should not be given recognition if it really
answers the needs of a complex and enlightened society."; Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage (1922) 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 5o6: "It is submitted...
that whenever a wrongful act by a defendant creates an emotional disturbance in
a plaintiff from which injurious physical consequences can be found as a fact to
have resulted, the right to recover is complete, unless some affirmative defense is
made out."; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts
(1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1o33, 1o58; 1 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 1o59.
2
Emden v. Vitz et al., 198 P. (2d) 696 (Cal. App. 1948); Dunn v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S. E. 189 (19o7); Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S. W.
195 (Ky. 19o9); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 2o8 N. W. 814 (1926); Saenger
Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 18o Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938); Lipman v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. Co., io8 S. C. 151, 93 S. E. 714 (1917); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874, 879-887.
3Smith v. Gowdy, 196 Ky. 281, 244 S. W. 678 (1922); Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R. R., 65 N. J. L.
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The recent Ohio case of Bartow v. Smith 4 serves to demonstrate
both the perseverance with which the courts still cling to this view
and the insecurity of the foundation on which it rests. The plaintiff,
Mrs. Bartow, who was pregnant at the time the offense occurred,
brought an action for slander, charging the defendant with the wilful, intentional, and malicious infliction of mental suffering which
produced physical injury upon her through the use of obnoxious and
profane language directed toward her by the defendant who knew of
her condition.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the acts alleged did not amount to a case of
slander per se, and that special damages necessary to sustain an action
of slander per quod were not pleaded. The appellate court reversed
that judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff, though failing to make
out a cause of action for slander, was entitled under Ohio procedure to
go to the jury on the allegation that defendant's wilful acts caused
"emotional disturbance and bodily injury to her nerves....,5
Called upon to choose between the theories adopted by the two
lower tribunals, the Justices of the Supreme Court of Ohio divided
four to three in reversing the intermediate court and reinstating the
trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiff's petition. The majority regarded the issue as being whether "profane and atrocious
language not slanderous and unaccompanied by menacing actions or
attitudes, threats, trespass, or invasions of the serenity of private
premises or a home [gives] rise to a cause of action," 6 and held that
the defendant's conduct, though "atrocious, inexcusable and certainly unworthy of any one claiming to be a gentleman," 7 was not actionable because none of the traditional forms of action comprehended
the situation stated in the petition.
In adopting the orthodox common law rule that on technical
grounds mere words are not actionable, the court also endorsed the
practical reasons usually advanced for the rule:
"'The damages sought to be recovered are too remote and speculative. The injury is more sentimental than substantial. Being
383, 47 AUt. 561 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896);
Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 61 At. 1022 (19o5); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874,
875.
'149 Ohio St. 3o1, 78 N. E. (2d) 735 (1948).
"149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 737 (1948).
6149 Ohio St. 3o, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 739 (1948).
7149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 740 (1948).
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easily simulated and hard to disprove, there is no standard by
which it can be justly, or even approximately, compensated.' "8
In two vigorous dissenting opinions, the minority of the court attacked the reasoning of the majority as attempting "to test liability in
this case by postulating the tort of assault, and then assuming the position that, since the words spoken did not constitute a technical assault, no recovery can be had."9 Rather than restrict liability within
such narrow limits, the dissent argued that "When any person wilfully,
intentionally and without excuse sets in motion forces which cause
physical injury to another by whatever means he may choose, he becomes liable under the law for such physical injury or harm."' 10
The technical nature of the majority's legal objections to the plaintiff's complaint as well as the narrowness of the difference which
separated the two sides of the court are both indicated by the emphasis
which the prevailing opinion lays on the absence of any allegation of
assault, battery or trespass in the'facts set out in the petition. It was
dearly implied that had the plaintiff alleged "that she was put in
fear or terror or that defendant was guilty of any conduct which
amounted to even a slight assault... [or] that there was... [a] violation of the serenity, peace and quiet of the home," a good cause of action would have been stated, on which the jury could have awarded
damages for mental suffering."
Professor Prosser has described this device for making mere words
actionable, as consisting of the allegation of some independent tort,
such as assault or false imprisonment, which provides a cause of action
8149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 740 (1948), quoting Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky.
471, 112 S. NV. 6oo, 6oi (igo8) which was quoted with approval in Smith v. Gowdy,
196 Ky. 281, 285, 244 S. W. 678, 679 (1922).
8149 Ohio St. 3o, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 743 (1948).
10149 Ohio St. 3o, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 743 (1948). See also the separate dissent of
Judge Zimmerman, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 746: ". .. where one wilfully and with a
malicious motive uses vile and opprobrious language toward another, under conditions where deleterious consequences might reasonably be anticipated, and the
use of such language does in fact cause an emotional disturbance resulting in
physical harm, the actor may be made to respond in damages for the consequences
of his inexcusable and reprehensible conduct."
1 4 9 Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 740 (1948). See Interstate Life & Accident
Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S. E. 458, 463 (1937). Plaintiff was allowed to
recover for mental pain and suffering, where an insurance agent entered plaintiff's
sick room and willfully caused an altercation over the amount of insurance due,
though the only physical impact resulted from the agent's tossing some coins Onto
the bed, one of them striking plaintiff's body. "However slight the injury occasioned
by the impact of the coin, it was nevertheless such a physical injury as would, with
pain and suffering, make out a case for the assessment of damages...."
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to serve as "a peg upon which to hang the mental damages."' 2 He calls
these "parasitic damages" the "entering wedge," opening the way
for the ultimate recognition of liability for mental suffering. But as yet,
the cases still sustain the necessity of the independent tort, in fact if not
in holding, on which to hang the "parasitic damages."' 3 Thus, a recognized form of action must be alleged in a plaintiff's complaint to
make it possible for the case to go to the jury. 14 And no doubt, in many
cases where the plaintiff has suffered great mental anguish, and a
traditional type of action was alleged in the complaint, the jury has
"found" the independent tort whether it existed or not, thereby permitting the plaintiff to recover for the mental suffering.
The judicial resistance to abandonment of the rule requiring an
independent tort may well spring in part from the fact that, if the rule
were not adhered to, it would hardly ever be possible for the court to
dispose of a case on demurrer. Questions which under the orthodox
rule are questions of law and within the province of the court would
become questions of fact to be determined by the jury. Whether the
complaint states a cause of action would still be a question for the
court, but allegations of any conduct which causes mental suffering
would, as far as the court is concerned, be sufficient to state a cause of
action. The contention that this result is undesirable is met in Continental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 5 in which the court stated that the
actionable words statute of Mississippi which leaves to the jury the
question of whether the words are actionable has not been found unsatisfactory from an administrative standpoint.
'12Prosser, Torts (1941) 58.
a1Emden v. Vitz et al., t98 P. (2d) 696 (Cal. App. 1948); Bartow v. Smith, 149
Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735 (1948). See also cases cited note 3, supra.
"'Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S. E. 458 1937),
note I1, supra.
2173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753, 754, (1935): "The great weight of authority, under
the common law, is that mere words ,however offensive or insutling, when the conduct of the party does not amount to an assault, are not actionable .... Whether
this general doctrine of the common law is to be put upon the basis that the violation of right in such cases belongs merely to the domain of good morals and
is not a wrong of which the law should take cognizance, or whether it has been
thought that the door would be opened too wide for the maintenance of fictitious
claims, or, if not fictitious, that injuries resulting from such wrongs are so difficult
of estimation according to dependable legal standards that it would be better in
the interest of the community to deny them, we need not now pause to consider;
but we might, with propriety add that if the latter be the ground upon which the
common-law judges were moved to deny the action, our own experience under our
actionable words statute, section 1i, Code 1930 ... has been such as to largely disprove the fears entertained by the ancient judges."
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The decision in another recent case, Emden v. Vitz et al.,'0 handed
down by a California District Court of Appeal, gives force to the indication in the Ohio case that the so-called "entering wedge" device
is beginning to destroy the solidity of the orthodox common law forms
of action. In that case, the plaintiff, upon discovering that her key
would not open the door of her apartment, went to the manager's
office in the apartment building to complain and seek assistance. There
the plaintiff was met by the three defendants, the manager and two female assistants. With one assistant leaning against the door so that
the plaintiff could not leave, the other two defendants screamed and
shouted and shook papers at her, saying that the OPA could not run
the property and that she no longer had an apartment there. The plaintiff was frightened, and as a result of the fright suffered physical injuries.
The trial court held that the plaintiff had been unlawfully evicted
from her apartment and that defendants had wrongfully withheld
permission to remove her personal belongings. The plaintiff was
awarded judgment of $1,ooo damages for loss of personal property,
and $2,ooo for personal injuries.
On appeal, the court rejected the defendant's contention "that
there can be no cause of action for personal injuries resulting from
fright caused chiefly by spoken words alone,"' 7 and affirmed the judgment for personal injuries. The court's holding was based on the proposition that "the right to maintain an action for a wrongful invasion
of [physical well-being] cannot validly turn upon any supposed distinction between cases where the physical injuries are the direct and
immediate result of the defendant's wrongful conduct, and cases where
they are the consequence of mental or emotional excitation caused by
that conduct."' s The right to recover is "dependent upon the nature
9
of the results rather than the nature of the tortious conduct."'
Although the court recognized that "The determination whether or
not given conduct is legally wrongful ... may involve factual distinctions of importance and substance," 20 noticeable in the decision is the
absence of any statement of reasons for and finding that the defendants'
conduct was tortious. Also, the court cited as authority cases21 which
2898 P. (2d) 696 (Cal. App. 1948).
1798 P. (2d) 696, 698 (Cal. App. 1948).
1B198 P. (ad) 696, 698, 699 (Cal. App. 1948).
11198 P. (2d) 696, 699 (Cal. App. 1948).
"198 P. (ad) 696, 700 (Cal. App. 1948).
2Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 5o8, 159 Pac. 401 (1916); Johnson v. Sampson, 167
Minn. 203, 2o8 N. W. 814 (1926).
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were distinguished in Bartow v. Smith22 because of the presence of an
independent tort. There is no doubt that the California court could
have found a recognized type of tort action had it sought to do so,
because the evidence showed facts sufficient to constitute false imprisonment and assault. But no such effort was made. Apparently assuming the independent tort, or perhaps finding it in the mere words
of the defendants (which from the language of the decision is most
probable), or perhaps simply not requiring one, the court stated,
". . once the wrongful quality [of the defendant's conduct] is established, it matters not whether that conduct consisted of acts alone, ...
or of mere spoken words alone, for the legal inquiry in each case is
thenceforth confined to the well-established channels of proximate
cause and damages. '23 The similarity of this language to that employed
by the dissenting justices in Bartow v. Smith 24 is easily observed.
Having avoided the technical objections to recognizing the cause
of action, the California court also brushed aside the "practical" arguments. In refuting the defendants' contention that maintenance of
such an action would flood the courts with litigation, it was declared
that the contention "is but an argument that the courts are incapable
of performing their appointed tasks, a premise which has frequently
25
been rejected."
Since this case, on the facts, can be placed in the same category
with prior cases which allowed recovery for mental suffering after
first finding a recognized tort, it remains to be seen whether other
courts will follow it as precedent for allowing mere words to be actionable when they result in injurious physical consequences. However, from the decision of the California court and the vigorous dissent in Bartow v. Smith,26 it seems that the courts are at least beginning to think seriously about the argument of the textwriters that
mental suffering incurred as a result of a deliberate "verbal assault"
should be recognized as the basis of a cause of action without any very
drastic departure from established law. As observed by the dissent in
the Bartow case, "In recent years, the courts have ... determined
that it is the responsibility of the law to grant a remedy for a substantial wrong even though a new term must be invented to describe it."27
hio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 738 (1948).
"Emden v. Vitz, et al., 198 P. (2d) 696, 700 (Cal. App. 1948).
24149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 743, 746 (1948). See text at notes 9 and lo
supra.
2Emden v. Vitz et al., 198 P. (2d) 696, 700 (Cal. App. 1948).
0.i149 Ohio St. 8oi, 18 N.-E. (2d).735 (1948).
7149
Ohio St. 301, 78 N. E. (2d) 735, 740, 741 (1948). "
2149
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Mental suffering or "mental anguish" has been called by Professor
Prosser an "orphan child;" 28 but since an orphan once had known
parents, perhaps it would be more correct to say that this child is
about to be legitimatized by the courts and will soon find itself spoken
to, if not welcome, within the family of torts.
GEORGE H.

ToRTs-LIABILITY

GRAY

OF RADIO STATION FOR DEFAIATION BROADCAST BY

LESSEE OF ITS FACILITIES.

[New Jersey]

The recent case of Kelly v. Hoffman et al.,1 while adding one more
decision in a field of law in which there exists a paucity of precedents,
calls attention once more to the unsettled state of the law of radio defamation. In this case of first impression in the state, the Court of
Errors and Appeals of New Jersey2 refused to apply the rule of so-called
absolute liability against the defendant radio broadcasting corporation which had leased its facilities to a co-defendant whose employee
had spoken defamatory words concerning plaintiff into its microphone. Rather, the court held that the defendant broadcasting company would be liable only if a lack of due care could be shown, electing to decide the case upon the duty of the defendant as a disseminator
of the defamation rather than as a publisher. The majority opinion
avoids the issue of whether radio defamation should be considered as
libel or slander, saying that such a decision is immaterial to the facts
at hand since the defamatory words were actionable per se and no
special damages need be alleged or proved.
Contending that radio defamation is of an unique character, a
strong dissent criticizes the majority opinion's attempt to place such
objectionable broadcasting in the same category as dissemination of
defamatory material by news-vendors and book sellers. The dissenting Justice advocates, instead, the imposition of absolute liability regardless of fault:
"Stringent as it may be, this rule is justified by the almost limitless publication which radio broadcasting achieves. In a fleeting
uProsser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort (1939) 37 Mich.
L. Rev. 874.
'61 A. (2d) 143 (N. J. 1948).
2On September 15, 1948, twelve days after the principal case was decided, a
revision of the New Jersey court system was put into effect, under which the new
Supreme Court replaced the former Court of Errors and Appeals. See Special Number of the Rutgers University Law Review, Nov., 1948, at page 59.
"
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minute a defamatory remark is spread to the general public
without effective means of retraction. Thus radio broadcasting
compares to libel in its widespread publication, obtained in the
latter case through written communications. On the other hand,
being spoken, whether from manuscript or not, it resembles
slander. The nature of this defamation, therefore, does not
permit its identification as libel or slander and to be properly
treated should be classed as a distinct and new problem." 3
Though an analysis of the various aspects of the controversy indicates
that the result reached by the decision is sound, the court has not
been able to contribute much to the attainment of a solution to the
problems of whether liablity without fault should be applied to radio
stations and whether defamation by radio should be classified as libel
or slander or a distinct new tort.
The popular justification for the familiar distinction between types
of defamation is that libel, being written or printed, reveals more
malice and is of a more permanent nature, and therefore can be presumed to cause more damage. However, the real basis of the distinction appears to spring from historical accident, 4 and when cases of radio defamation began to come before the courts, a very nice problem
was presented in the development of the substantive law to meet the
advances of science. Several courts have side-stepped the question, saying that a determination of whether the reading of defamatory words
from a script constitutes libel or slander is immaterial to the case at
hand; 5 but when compelled to meet the issue, the American courts have
uniformly held that the reading of defamatory matter constitutes libel.6 In an Australian case, 7 however, the Supreme Court of Victoria
sKelly v. Hoffman et al., 61 A. (2d) 143, 147 (N. J. 1948).
'The Star Chamber had first assumed jurisdiction over the new art of printing,
adopting the Roman law and treating libel as a criminal matter. When the common law courts took over the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber in 1641, libel retained some of its criminal aspects and was treated as a tort distinct from slander,
which had long been within the jurisdiction of the law courts. See Restatement,
Torts (1938) § 568, comment (b). For an early criticism of this distinction, see
Lord Mansfield's opinion in Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep.
367 (1812).
5

Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N. Y. S. (2d)
985 (1942); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P- (2d) 1127. (1937); Miles v. Louis
Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (933)"Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934); Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. io98 (1932); Hartmann v.
Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 73 N. E. (2d) 30, 171 A. L. R. 759 (1947); Hryhorijiv (Grigorieff) v. Winchell, i8o Misc. 574, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 31 (1943), aff'd without opinion 267
App.7 Div. 817, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 102 (1943).
Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Ltd., [1932] Vict. L. R. 425.
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ruled that the reading of defamatory matter from a script was slander"
and not libel, basing the holding on the fact that the publication of a
libel must convey to the persons to whom it is published the permanent
form in which it is expressed or recorded, citing by analogy libel by
statute, effigy, or picture, which cannot be published by oral description.
The legal character of defamatory remarks extemporaneously uttered into the microphone, without a written script, was considered
in Locke v. Gibbons.8 There, defendant, a newscaster, in order to make
the news more exciting and dramatic, "interpolated" certain untrue
remarks during a broadcast of plaintiff's news report of floods in the
Ohio Valley, and plaintiff contended that this action injured him in
his business as a news reporter. The New York court held these extemporaneous defamatory remarks to be slander since that tort had long
been considered as spoken defamation, no matter how large the audience. Direct authority on this issue is still scarce and inconclusive, and
the American Law Institute's refusal to take any definite position as
to whether an extemporaneous defamatory broadcast would constitute
libel or slander is indicative of the general uncertainty at this point.9
The question of whether a radio broadcasting corporation which has
leased its facilities is to be held absolutely liable or merely to a standard
of due care for defamation broadcast over its niiechanisms, is much
more fundamental. Exponents of the absolute liability view present an
analogy of radio broadcasting to the newspaper publishing trade, arguing that the broadcasting company is a publisher of defamation
just as is the newspaper publisher. 10 It has been contended that the
manipulation of the controls by the trained radio engineer during the
course of the broadcast amounts to an actual publishing of the defamatory matter in the same sense that the printing presses of a newspaper
publish a libel."' But this analogy has been discredited on the ground
that the newspaper, by setting the defamatory words into print, intends
to publish the written words, thereby "consenting,"' 12 while defamatory
remarks may be suddenly launched out into the air-ways by a speaker
8164 Misc. 877,

299 N. Y. Supp. 188 (1937).
'Restatement, Torts (1938) § 568, comment (f).
"Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L .R. lO98 (1932); Miles
v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (1933).
"Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts (1940) 88 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 249; Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio (1935) 19 Minn. L.
Rev. 611.
"Seitz, Responsibility of Radio Stations for Extemporaneous Defamation (1940)
24 Marq. L. Rev. 117.
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before the program monitor can cut him off. Also, the newspaper has
an opportunity through its proof-readers and type-setters to check
its material carefully for any defamation which might be contained
therein.
Several analogies have been urged in favor of imposing upon the
radio broadcasting company only a limited liability based on negligence standards. In the first of these it is contended that the broadcasting of defamation is similar to a telephone company's carrying
defamatory words over its lines; but this reasoning is easily refuted by
the fact that the telephone company is a common carrier and cannot
discriminate among its users, and that it merely carries the message
13
from the speaker to one listener, "in a sealed envelope, as it were."'
The telegraph analogy is also suggested to avoid absolute liability,
14
for the telegraph company is held only to a standard of due care.
But this argument is rejected because the courts feel that there is not
sufficient similarity between the transmitting of written messages and
the actual processes of broadcasting, and also that there is a vast difference in the extent of the harm done by the widespread defamation
of radio. 15
Professor Bohlen has offered other and more persuasive comparisons in support of the limited liability view.16 The radio station, if
treated as a disseminator of the defamatory matter such as a newsvendor or book seller, would be liable for the defamation if, and only
if, it had failed to exercise reasonable care to keep scandelmongers away
from its microphones. This view was adopted by the principal case.
Also, there seems to be little difference between the activity of a radio
station and that of the proprietor of a large auditorium equipped with
a public address system who leases his facilities to a political orator to
address a large audience.
In the few decisions in this field, adoption of the newspaper analogy
has been the common basis for imposing liability without fault. In
1932, Sorensen v. Wood,1 cited and approved the following year by
Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc.,'5 held the radio broadcasting company
"Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 899, 89o (W. D. Mo. 1934).
222 N. C. 75, 21 S. E. (2d) 876 (1942); Restatement, Torts

"'Parker v. Edwards,
(1938) § 612.

Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. (2d) 302,
A. L. R. 968 (1939); Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio
(1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 611, 652-3.
1Summit

124

16

Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1937) 5o Harv. L. Rev. 725, 731.
Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. 1098 (1932).
2 1 7 2 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (1933).
17123
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absolutely liable under the newspaper analogy. In each of these cases
a script had been submftted, and the station had had ample opportunity to check it for defamatory matter. This line of authority was
carried even further in 193 4 , by the case of Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.,19 in which a federal court held a Kansas City radio station
absolutely liable when the program during which the defamatory
words were read originated in New York City and was carried to the
local outlet station in Kansas City by telephonic connection. Following
the newspaper analogy, the court seemed to believe that since the
Sorensen and Miles cases could have been decided on the basis of negligence, their holding the broadcasting company liable irrespective of
fault served to make them especially strong authority for the imposition
of absolute liability.
The leading case in support of the limited liability view is Summit
Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. 2 0 There, after the broadcasting company had exercised all possible care, and a script containing
no defamatory matter had been rehearsed several times for the radio
program, the sponsor's master of ceremonies uttered an extemporaneous
defamatory remark concerning plaintiff. It was held that the newspaper analogy did not apply to the field of extemporaneous radio defamation, and the court said that "a close examination of the Pennsylvania law [of defamation by newspapers] will show that our rule is
not one of absolute liability, but rather, of a very strict standard of
2
care to ascertain the truth of the published matter." '
With the decision of the New Jersey court in the principal case the
sanction of one more precedent is added to the limited liability view,
but this merely leaves the courts in more even division on the point.
While the text writers generally favor the adoption by the courts of
the view of the Summit Hotel Co. decision, the suggestion in the instant case that such "questions of social policy [are] to be resolved in
the legislative forum"22 may indicate the more appropriate method
of settling the controversy. Several state statutes have already been
passed imposing only limited liability based upon negligence standards of due care. An Iowa statute 33 requires the broadcasting company
to prove the exercise of due care to exonerate itself from liability, while
08 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 19g4).
0336 Pa. 182, 8 A. (2d) 02, 124 A. L. R. 968 (1939).
1336 Pa. 182, 8 A. (2d) 302, 307, 124 A. L. R. 968, 975 (1939).
-61 A. (2d) 143, 146 (N. J. 1948).
2Iowa Code (1946) c. 659.5.
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a Florida law 24 gives the radio station the right to compel the submission of a written script at least twenty-four hours before the proposed broadcast, and if the script is submitted and checked the station will not be liable for "ad-libbed" defamatory utterances.
Similar action is needed by other legislatures to bring about a
quicker and more precise determination of the nature of the liability
of radio broadcasting companies leasing their facilities than can be
attained by the slow and piecemeal method of judicial decision, as represented by the principal case.
WILLIAM

"Fla. Stat. (1941) § 770.0.
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